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ABSTRACT 
Financial inclusion has become an important public policy priority following the recent global 
financial crisis. Yet, we know very little of how it impacts soundness of the providers of financial 
services. Using an international sample of 2,600 banks in 86 countries over the period 2004-12, 
we find that higher level of financial inclusion contributes to greater bank stability. The positive 
association is particularly pronounced with those banks that have higher customer deposit funding 
share and lower marginal costs of providing banking services; and also with those that operate in 
countries with stronger institutional quality. The results are robust to instrumental variables 
analysis, controlling for bank fixed effects, alternative measures of financial inclusion, among 
several other robustness tests. Our results highlight that the importance of ensuring inclusive 
financial system is not only a development goal but also an issue that should be prioritised by 
banks, as such a policy drive is good for their stability.  
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“The stark reality is that most poor people in the world still lack access to sustainable financial 
services, whether it is savings, credit or insurance. The great challenge before us is to address the 
constraints that exclude people from full participation in the financial sector. Together, we can 
and must build inclusive financial sectors that help people improve their lives.”  
 
Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
 
1. Introduction 
Financial inclusion, that is, all economic agents have access to formal financial services 
and can use such services effectively, has become an important public policy priority following 
the recent global financial crisis. For instance, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the G20 
leaders recognised the mutually reinforcing policy objectives of financial inclusion, stability and 
consumer protection. As financial exclusion has been identified by policy makers as a key barrier 
to development globally, expanding banking services to all has been prioritised by governments 
to make financial inclusion a reality (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015).1 Over the past decades, the 
central banks in emerging and developed countries have taken initiatives in conjunction with 
multilateral agencies including the IMF, G20, the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), and the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) to enhance the inclusive banking agenda. Recent 
studies show that greater access has both social and economic benefits.2 In particular, greater 
access to finance: increases savings (e.g., Aportela, 1999; Allen et al., 2016); reduces income 
inequality and poverty (e.g., Burgess and Pande, 2005; Beck et al., 2007a; Bruhn and Love, 2014); 
increases employment (e.g., Prasad, 2010); improves mental well-being (e.g., Karlan and Zinman, 
2010; Angelucci et al., 2013); favours education (e.g., Flug et al., 1998); helps making better 
                                                 
1 Recent study suggests that almost 2.5 billion adults, just over half of the world’s adult population, do not use any 
form of formal financial services, where 19% and 72% of them are from developed and developing countries, 
respectively (Kendall et al., 2010).  
2 See, for example: Wurgler (2000); Beck et al. (2000); Klapper et al. (2006); Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008); Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. (2015); Burgess and Pande (2005), and Banerjee et al. (2013) in India; Bruhn and Love (2009) and Bruhn 
and Love (2014) in Mexico; Karlan and Zinman (2010) in South Africa; Dupas and Robinson (2009) in Kenya. 
 3 
decision (e.g., Mani et al., 2013); and enhances new firm creation (e.g., Guiso et al., 2004; Klapper 
et al., 2006; Banerjee et al., 2013).  
While the literature provides evidence on the positive role of financial inclusion in 
promoting wellbeing of households and economic growth, little attention has been devoted to 
investigate whether such a development goal has ramifications on soundness of banks: one of the 
important reasons why banks ‘shy away’ from extending financial services to disadvantaged 
segments of the society. In recent years, with the advancement of innovative technology, formal 
financial institutions are increasingly searching for new opportunities and markets and seeing the 
benefits of micro-finance style of operations.3 By exploiting superior scale, skill and technological 
capacity (Peachy and Roe, 2006; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008; Beck et al., 2011), banks can provide 
financial services to a large customer base potentially at a reduced cost, whilst helping reduce risk 
by having more non-wholesale funding as reliance on higher share of non-deposit funding 
contributed to the recent demise of investment banking in the US (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2010; Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011).4 Using a large sample of bank-level data on 2600 
banks across 86 countries over the period 2004-12, we focus on the impact of this specific 
dimension of financial development (financial sector inclusiveness) on bank stability as an 
important regulatory issue at the micro level, and find that inclusive finance and bank stability are 
indeed complementary.  
To our knowledge, there is no direct empirical evidence on the channels through which 
financial inclusion affects bank stability. Existing literature implicitly indicates several potential 
                                                 
3 See a detailed survey in Harper and Arora (2005) on why commercial banks are so much interested in micro-
finance style of operations. 
4 In this context, it is important to note the growth of venture capital investment in financing small firms in the recent 
decades. Cole et al. (2016) empirically show that conventional banking still remains an important source of small 
business finance in the US. Small entrepreneurial activity can therefore benefit from financial inclusion. 
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channels through which financial inclusion may influence soundness of banks or risk-taking (see 
Section 2). In particular, by reaching out to more customers, banks may garner ample cheap retail 
deposits whilst reducing reliance on volatile wholesale funding (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2010). By increasing proximity with customers, they can help reduce informational asymmetry, 
and by adopting more innovative, affordable and low-cost financial delivery models, they also 
reduce marginal costs of production. Finally, as greater financial inclusion is associated with 
stronger legal rights and politically stable environments (Allen et al., 2016), in an inclusive 
financial sector, stronger institutional quality may facilitate efficient financial intermediation, and 
hence greater stability (Hawkins, 2006). 
This study fills this gap and makes several contributions to the literature. First, while most 
empirical papers assess the effect of financial inclusion on various socio-economic indicators (e.g., 
Butler and Cornaggia, 2011; Allen et al., 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013a; Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al., 2013b) and/or provide evidences that are either anecdotal5 or use simple analyses at macro-
level (e.g., Hannig and Jansen, 2010; Han and Melecky, 2013; Morgan and Pontines, 2014), this 
paper is the first, to our knowledge, investigating the impact of financial inclusion on bank-level 
stability. We specifically focus on bank stability, as banks are responsible for providing the bulk 
of financial services to households/firms in any economy, and therefore, a clear understanding of 
this link is of immense managerial and economic importance for inclusive financial development 
and growth. We use financial outreach and usage dimensions to construct a composite index of 
financial inclusion at country level, and employ both the index and its associated dimensions to 
see the effect on bank-level stability in a cross-country analysis while controlling for bank-specific, 
                                                 
5 Tetangco, A., “Philippines CBG: the positive influence of financial inclusion”, the Banker, October 1st 2013,  
http://www.thebanker.com/Comment/Viewpoint/Philippines-CBG-the-positive-influence-of-financial-
inclusion?ct=true 
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country-specific, and institutional characteristics that one typically encounters in financial 
development literature. The time series dimension of this index allows us to exploit within country 
variation in the inclusiveness of the financial sector, and explore the effect on bank stability in a 
systematic way, which is hard to get if we use demand-side data, such as the World Bank global 
financial inclusion index (henceforth Global Findex).  
Second, this paper also contributes to the literature that explores the determinants of 
banking stability (e.g., Berger et al., 2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Houston et al., 2010; Beck 
et al., 2013; Anginer et al., 2014). Finally, this study complements the finance-growth literature in 
the sense that higher levels of financial inclusion are likely to influence overall supply of credit to 
small firms (Beck et al., 2008), and to firms in those industries that are in need of more external 
finance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), enhancing overall economic growth. 
 Our results indicate that there is a strong link between financial inclusion and bank 
stability. In particular, the higher the degree of financial inclusion, the better the bank performance 
in terms of reducing risks. Taking individual dimensions, we also find a positive and significant 
relation between financial outreach/usage and bank stability after controlling for an array of control 
variables. The results remain unchanged in a battery of sensitivity tests, namely instrumental 
variable two-stage regression to address the endogeneity of financial inclusion, dynamic panel 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator to avoid omitted variable bias, alternative 
measures of bank stability and financial inclusion, and quantile regression to see impact of 
financial inclusion at different points in the conditional distribution of the dependent variable.  
Besides, we explore the possible channels through which financial inclusion influences 
bank soundness. We find that the positive association between inclusive financial sector and bank 
stability is particularly pronounced with those banks that have higher customer deposit funding 
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share and lower marginal costs, and with those that operate in an institutional environment that is 
stronger. 
The remaining part of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the related 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and descriptive statistics. 
Section 4 discusses the empirical results with sensitivity analyses on the effect of financial 
inclusion on bank stability. Section 5 explores the possible channels through which financial 
inclusion affects the soundness of banks. Section 6 concludes with some policy implications.  
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
In this section, we discuss the related literature and formulate hypothesis that inclusive 
financial sector can influence the degree of bank stability.  
2.1. Benefits ensued by greater financial inclusion 
In an inclusive financial sector, financial institutions may have more opportunities to garner 
cheap retail deposits,6 and thus reduce marginal costs of producing banking services output. 
Inclusiveness may also help banks to reduce asymmetric information problem by having more 
engaged relationship with customers (Petersen and Rajan, 1995), and can be more effective in an 
environment that is more politically stable (Allen et al., 2016).  
2.1.1. Financial inclusion and diversified retail deposit funding 
Banks strategically engage in different intermediation activities and select asset mix and 
funding structures to achieve their business objectives (Roengpitya et al., 2014). Taking an 
international sample of 222 banks, Roengpitya et al. (2014) identify three distinct business models 
                                                 
6 Several governments, especially in the developing countries, are making financial inclusion an essential part of their 
national plans. For example, on 28 August 2014, government of India has launched the ‘Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan 
Yojana’ (Prime Minister's People Money Scheme), with the explicit aim of removing financial exclusion. Though this 
scheme has an option for opening new bank accounts with zero balance, banks were able to garner deposits of ₹1500 
crore (US$240 million) within two weeks of the launch of the scheme, with around 30.2 million new accounts. 
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of banks by evaluating the asset mix and funding strategies: retail-funded, wholesale-funded, and 
capital market-oriented. The retail-funded banks are those that rely on large stable funding sources 
including deposits and have a large share of borrowings on the balance sheet; the wholesale-funded 
banks are those that have a high share of loan liabilities on the balance sheet (including interbank 
loans); and finally, capital market-oriented banks are those that have half of their assets in the form 
of tradable securities and are mostly funded in wholesale markets. Studies also show that the choice 
of business model, that is, asset mix and funding structures, influences risk and return of banks 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Ayadi and De Groen, 2014; Roengpitya et al., 2014).  
The recent literature shows that banks that adopt retail-funded business model can reduce 
distress relatively more. It is argued that retail deposits are sluggish, insensitive to risks and provide 
a stable cheaper source of long term funding (e.g., see  Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Song and 
Thakor, 2007), compared to wholesale funding which is extremely volatile and often costly (e.g., 
see Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Huang and Ratnovski, 2011; Poghosyan and Čihak, 
2011).7 Huang and Ratnovski (2011) show that wholesale financiers are prone to very mild 
negative information or rumours on the quality of bank projects, and hence reluctant to rollover 
short-term funding. While comparing informed and arm’s length debt, Rajan (1992) finds that the 
informed debt holders (i.e., wholesale funders) could discontinue funds for a project with negative 
present value unless they are compensated with higher interest rate. Recent empirical studies show 
that banks relying more on wholesale funding rather than retail deposits were less stable during 
the recent financial crisis (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011). 
                                                 
7 The retail deposits are sluggish because the withdrawals are motivated by the individual depositors’ liquidity need, 
and thus it is predictable based on the law of large numbers. In addition, they are insensitive to risk partly because of 
the deposit insurance provided by governments (e.g., Kim et al., 2003; Song and Thakor, 2007). For example, in all 
the recent bank failures (e.g., Continental Illinois, Northern Rock, IndyMac), it was short-term wholesale financiers 
who exited faster than retail depositors without having significant losses. In the case of Northern Rock, retail 
depositors run on bank took place after it had nearly exhausted its liquid assets to pay short-term wholesale financiers 
(Shin, 2009; Goldsmith-Pinkham and Yorulmazer, 2010). 
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In particular, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), using a sample of listed banks in 101 countries 
over the period 1995-2007, find that higher level of non-deposit funding shares increases banking 
fragility. Hannig and Jansen (2010) argue that during the recent credit crunch when the wholesale 
funding dried up, it was the diversified retail deposit base that cushioned financial institutions from 
fragility.  
In an inclusive financial sector, when banks extend deposit facilities to a large pool of 
customers, they are able to attract a large number of retail deposits, which are often cheaper than 
wholesale funding. Collins et al. (2009) find that poor households are intensive users of savings 
instruments, whereas Allen et al. (2016) argue that savings instruments provide a great deal of 
flexibility to households for both payments and savings, and therefore savings products are more 
likely to be demanded by unbanked or underbanked adults relative to loan products. Therefore, in 
an inclusive financial sector, banks with higher retail deposit funding should be able to reduce 
funding costs and risks, and thus become more stable.  
2.1.2. Financial inclusion, marginal costs, and market power 
Recent literature shows that the distance between financial institutions and customers 
undermines efficacy of financial services through intensification of asymmetric information 
problem (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006; Mian, 2006; Deng and 
Elyasiani, 2008). Hauswald and Marquez (2006) show that financial institutions get precise signal 
about customer’s quality when distance with them is reduced. By reducing distance, financial 
institutions are able to build a good relationship, and hence internalise the benefits of supporting 
informationally opaque customers. With the competitive advantage of better information, banks 
can make judicious lending decisions, and set prices accordingly while mitigating moral hazards 
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and adverse selection problems (see Sharpe, 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Buch et al., 2012).8 
Banks can exploit scale economies and reduce marginal costs to achieve greater market power. 
Since market power is the gap between price and marginal cost expressed as a percentage of price, 
higher market power would reflect whether banks are able to minimise marginal costs. In this line 
of argument, Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Di Patti and Dell'Ariccia (2004) show that banks 
disburse more credits to small firms when they have greater market power. Therefore, in an 
inclusive financial sector, banks with lower marginal costs should be able to reduce excessive risk-
taking, and thus become more stable.  
 
2.1.3. Financial inclusion, political stability, and stronger institutions 
A large body of literature on the link between governance and economic growth argues 
that stronger institutions bring about better economic wellbeing (e.g., Barro, 1991; Keefer and 
Knack, 1997; Acemoglu et al., 2001). Using individual level data, in a recent study, Allen et al. 
(2016) show that financial inclusion is positively associated with stronger legal rights and more 
politically stable environments.9 Using firm-level data, Beck et al. (2005) show that firms 
operating in countries with more developed financial systems and with less country-level 
corruption face lower levels of financing constraints. They also argue that banks operating in 
countries with strong institutional quality may provide flexibility in terms of enforcing contracts 
with negligible delay. 
                                                 
8 Linking three unique datasets, in a more recent study, Beck et al. (2014) show that relationship lending alleviates 
SMEs’ credit constraints during a cyclical downturn, and this effect is strongest for smaller and more opaque firms, 
and in regions where the downturn is more severe. 
9 Bauchet et al. (2011) summarize evidence from randomized evaluations of microfinance. The general findings of 
these studies are that financial services have positive impact on numerous microeconomic indicators, including self-
employment, business activities, household consumption, and well-being. 
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 Using state-level data in India, Burgess and Pande (2005) find that expanding bank 
branches in the rural areas had a significant positive impact on poverty alleviation.10 Similarly, 
using randomized evaluation evidence from Mexico, Bruhn and Love (2014) suggest that 
facilitating better access to finance to the poorest of the poor has positive impact on poverty 
alleviation. They also find that access to financial services has positive impact on economic 
development through the channel of keeping individuals employed and fostering the survival and 
creation of informal business. As the nature of SMEs operations is labour intensive, Prasad (2010) 
observes that financial constraint to SMEs has adverse effects on employment growth. On a study 
of Compartamos borrowers in Mexico, Angelucci et al. (2013) find that access to credit does have 
a positive impact on mental well-being. Given the benefits of financial inclusion on various key 
socio-economic indicators, banks operating in an inclusive financial sector along with a stronger 
institutional quality could experience greater operating efficiency in financial intermediation, and 
hence their soundness.11 
2.2. Hypothesis 
Since in an inclusive financial sector, banks will have higher branch/ATM penetration 
across regions and will have customers of all income groups, it may have two opposing effects on 
the stability of banks. With regard to the benefits ensued by greater financial inclusion, we assume 
that when banks operate in an inclusive financial sector they would be able to attract more risk-
free cheaper retail deposits and reduce their marginal costs of production. On the other hand, there 
may be countervailing effects of inclusive financial sector associated with loss of banking stability 
due to informational asymmetries while dealing with poor households or small firms. It may also 
                                                 
10 Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), using branching deregulation implemented by different U.S. states over the period 
mid-1970s to mid-1990s, find that the relaxation of intra- and interstate branching had positive impact on economic 
growth.  
11 See, for instance, Khan (2011), Hannig and Jansen (2010), and Cull et al. (2012). 
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occur due to lack of managerial and technical expertise, and agency problems related to complex 
organisational and product structure required to serve a wide ranging customer base in an inclusive 
financial sector.12 We therefore argue in this paper that the benefits will outweigh the costs 
associated with greater financial inclusion, which leads to the Hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Financial inclusion is positively associated with bank stability. 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
To investigate the relationship between financial inclusion and bank stability, we draw data 
from a number of sources: (1) the bank level dataset is compiled from BankScope (provided by 
Bureau van Dijk and Fitch Ratings) that contains detailed balance sheet and income statement 
information for both public and private banks in any given country; (2) the macro data is compiled 
from the World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank; (3) the instruments for IV 
regressions are collected from the recent empirical studies on financial development, innovative 
technology, law, institutions, and finance database; (4) the variables used to construct financial 
inclusion index are compiled from the FAS database; (5) six indicators of institutional quality are 
taken from Kaufmann et al. (2010) Governance Index; and (6) firm-level indicators are taken from 
the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) to check the correlation between financial inclusion 
index and firms’ access to finance/firms’ financing obstacles. Our dataset comprises of 2,635 
commercial banks, cooperative banks and Islamic banks in 86 countries over the time period 2004-
12, which represent, respectively 57.4%, 41.3%, and 1.3% of the sample. Since the objective of 
this study is to investigate the impact of financial inclusion on bank stability, we apply a number 
of selection criteria to obtain our sample. First, we exclude countries for which we have no 
information on different dimensions of financial inclusion index. Second, we discard 
                                                 
12 See Acharya et al. (2006). 
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unconsolidated reports of banks whenever consolidated ones of the same group are available to 
offset double counting. Third, we drop banks that had information for fewer than three consecutive 
years, as the bank stability measures computed in this study are based on rolling windows over the 
past three years. We deflate all monetary values to 2005 (2005 = 100) prices using the GDP deflator 
of US obtained from WDI. The deflated series are reported in millions of US dollars ($). The 
variable definitions and the data sources are described in Appendix Table A1. 
 
3.1. Measuring bank risk 
We follow Laeven and Levine (2009) to measure Z-score which is widely used in the 
literature and considered to be an unbiased indicator of bank riskiness (see, for instance, Houston 
et al., 2010; Turk Ariss, 2010; Fang et al., 2014). Using assets returns, its volatility and leverage, 
we calculate Z-score as follows: 
( )
it it
it
it
ROA EQA
Z score
ROAσ
+
− =    (1) 
Where ROA  and EQA  are the average return-on-assets and the equity-to-assets ratio, respectively 
and ( )ROAσ  is the standard deviation of return-on-assets. We can interpret this score as the number 
of standard deviation below the mean by which returns would have to drop before all equity in the 
bank gets depleted (Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Beck et al., 2013). If banks’ profitability is normally 
distributed, the inverse proxy of Z-score can be considered as bank’s probability of insolvency. In 
other words, higher returns and capitalisation would increase bank stability, while volatile returns 
would decrease the stability of banks. To reduce skewness, we use natural logarithm of Z-score. 
To check the sensitivity of our results, we also use volatility of ROA. Following Beck et al. (2013), 
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we transform return volatility to make it directly proportional to banking stability as –
log(sd(ROA)). 
 
 
3.2. Measuring and verifying the strength of the financial inclusion index 
3.2.1. Financial inclusion index 
In an inclusive financial sector, any member of the economy, irrespective of background, 
should enjoy the ease of access and effectively use basic financial services. Using FAS database, 
we measure the index of financial inclusion for 86 countries for the period 2004-12. In general, 
there is a consensus, at least from the regulator’s perspective, that financial inclusion can be 
measured using two dimensions, namely the financial outreach and usage.13 Given the data 
availability constraint, the variable we use for each dimension often requires proxies.14 The 
financial outreach dimension is used to account for the pervasiveness of outreach of the financial 
sector in terms of banks’ physical outlets, as the distance to the point of financial services deems 
to be an important impediment to financial inclusion (see Allen et al., 2014). We use two classes 
of penetration of banking services i.e., demographic and geographic penetration of bank branch 
and ATM (Beck et al., 2007b, henchforth BDM). For the demographic penetration, we use the 
number of bank branches and number of ATMs per 100,000 people, and for the geographic 
penetration we use the number of bank branches and the number of ATMs per 1,000 square 
                                                 
13 See recent paper by Amidžic et al. (2014) on the measure of financial inclusion. In addition, AFI also uses these 
two dimensions to measure financial inclusion index – https://blogs.afi-global.org/2016/04/01/measuring-financial-
inclusion-in-one-number/ 
14 We also confirm our main findings using alternative measure of financial inclusion that is collected from Global 
Findex Database: an individual-level database comprised of survey data collected over the 2011 calendar year covering 
more than 150,000 adults in 148 economies. Since the costs and collection of survey data are demanding, and the 
availability of such data for longer period is unreasonable, we therefore focus on supply-side data–FAS database–that 
were collected by Beck et al. (2007b) at the World Bank for 2003-04, and later on extended by the Consultative Group 
to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and the IMF.  
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kilometres.15 For the usage dimension, we use the number of bank accounts per 1,000 populations 
to integrate the depth of the financial access.16 BDM (2007) investigate financial sector outreach 
and its determinants by using cross-country data to identify common trends across the 
abovementioned indicators. However, it is easier for the general public to comprehend and 
compare a composite indicator across countries that combines many correlated indicators (OECD, 
2008). In this paper, we overcome the shortcomings, and build upon BDM (2007) to introduce a 
multidimensional weighted index of all variables as a measure of financial inclusion. In our 
analysis, we use both the composite index and its associated dimensions to explore the relationship 
between financial inclusion and bank stability.17 
The components used in the construction of financial inclusion are highly correlated with 
each other. To sufficiently capture the common variation among these correlated components of 
financial inclusion as a single measure, we develop an index that represents the overall 
inclusiveness in the financial sector using principal components analysis (henceforth PCA, see 
online Appendix for details on PCA).18 The first principal component from PCA has the 
interpretation of being the single linear combination of the financial inclusion indicators that 
explains most of the variations we see in these indicators. This index will sufficiently deal with 
the problem of multicollinearity and over-parameterisation as a single measure of financial 
                                                 
15 As the distribution of bank branches and ATMs is not always uniform and often concentrated in urban areas of the 
country and provides access to some individuals using area- and population-based ratios may undermine the true 
penetration of banking services (BDM, 2007). 
16 The actual representation of penetration dimension would have been with data on the number of people having 
banking accounts rather than the number of accounts per capita. The caveat is that in the latter case the number of 
“banked” population might be overestimated due to dormant accounts and/or double count of accounts of the same 
person.  
17 If data on transaction costs and ease of transaction are available, one can also add such information to improve the 
quality of financial inclusion index. However, comparable macro data for a large number of countries is hard to get. 
For example, the annual fees charged to customers for ATM cards and/or accounts i.e. “transaction costs” and the 
minimum amount and/or document requires opening savings or checking accounts i.e. “ease of transaction”.  
18 Constructing composite index using principal components analysis is well-documented in several papers (see e.g.,  
Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Bali et al., 2014). 
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inclusion. Before using PCA, indicators of each dimension are normalised to have values between 
zero and one so that the scale in which they are measured is immaterial.19 Since the financial 
outreach dimension is comprised of four variables initially we capture common variation among 
four outreach variables using the PCA and construct this financial outreach dimension. 
Subsequently, we use the PCA to extract the common principal component (PC) of the two 
dimensions that capture different aspects of the inclusive financial sector: the financial outreach 
and usage of the financial services.  
The Appendix shows the results of the PCA. Regarding financial outreach dimension, the 
eigenvalues of the four PCs are 2.76, 0.71, 0.48, and 0.05, respectively, suggesting that the first 
principal component explains about 69% of the corresponding sample variance (see Panel A).20 
Except the first PC, no other PCs have eigenvalue greater than one; so we just take first component 
and extract the financial outreach dimension using weights (i.e., 0.53, 0.52, 0.46, and 0.48) 
assigned to first principal component. Regarding financial inclusion, the eigenvalues of the two 
PCs are 1.61 and 0.39, respectively, indicating that the first principal component explains about 
81% of the corresponding sample variance (see Panel B). Similarly, only the first principal 
component has eigenvalue that is more than one so we can assume that the first component 
sufficiently explains the common variation among the two dimensions.21 As shown in equation 
(2), we construct a multidimensional index for financial inclusion as follows:22 
1
   
n
ij i
i
Financial inclusion index Xω
=
= ∑    (2) 
                                                 
19 Prior to normalising, we winsorise each indicator at the 95th percentile levels to reduce the influence of outliers at 
the upper tail.  
20 See Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006). 
21 Since we drop few PCs, it also eliminates a part of the noise components from our data, which ultimately may yield 
more reliable estimates. 
22 Sarma and Pais (2011) measure a weighted index of financial inclusion using manual weights of the dimensions for 
a sample of 49 countries for the calendar year 2004.   
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Where ωij are the component’s loadings or weights; and iX are the original variables.23 We 
get same weights (i.e., 0.71) for both dimensions. In order to facilitate analysis and interpretation, 
we further normalise this index assigned to each country along a 0-1 scale, where zero indicates 
financial exclusion, and unity indicates financial inclusion. Figure 1 displays the level of financial 
inclusion by two sub-samples: developed and developing countries.   
3.2.2. Verifying the strength of the financial inclusion index 
Although our paper makes the first systematic attempt to construct a composite index of 
financial inclusion for a longer panel and then analyse its impact on banking stability, it is not 
without its limitations. In the construction of the index, affordability dimension, marketing 
exclusion and self-exclusion have not been addressed. However, despite these shortcomings, we 
see this construction of composite index and the associated analysis as a useful and important first 
step towards developing a more robust indicator of financial inclusion. In this section, we borrow 
ideas from BDM (2007), and also test the validity of financial inclusion index. First, we use the 
Global Findex survey database, and check the correlation between household-based indicators of 
financial inclusion and our financial inclusion index. In some recent studies (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al., 2013b; Allen et al., 2014), the most common variables that are used as the indicator of 
financial inclusion are adults with an account at a formal financial institution to total adults (%) 
(i.e., Share of household account) and adults saving at a financial institution in the past year to 
total adults (%) (i.e., Share of household saving). We find that our index is positively and 
significantly correlated at 1% significance level with these Global Findex indicators. We also 
                                                 
23 In order to check the stability and robustness of our financial inclusion index, we also use principal component 
analysis on a year-by-year basis in which loadings are determined annually instead of over the entire sample period. 
The correlation between these two indices (one where the loadings are derived over the entire sample period and the 
other derived annually) is very high (i.e. 0.98), indicating the robustness of our index irrespective of how loadings are 
determined.  
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assess the power of our index to see whether our index is useful in predicting these observable 
micro-level data.  
     0.18 (7.16)  0.96 (13.61)*  
     0.06 (3.75)  0.40 (8.83)*  
Share of household account Financial inclusion
Share of household saving Financial inclusion
= +
= +
  (3) 
We collapse our data at the country level and regress the share of household account (the 
share of household saving) on financial inclusion index using robust standard errors. The 
regression yields R2 of 64% (39%) with 80 observations. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis 
of equation (3). Financial inclusion index enters significantly at the 1% level, indicating that 
greater financial inclusion is positively associated with more households having accounts (savings) 
at financial institutions. The correlation between predicted share of household account (saving) 
and the actual share of household account (saving) at financial institution is 80% (63%). 
Second, so far we have seen that our index is powerful enough in predicting household-
based measure of financial access. Now, we use firm-level data taken from the WBES in order to 
gauge the relationship between financial inclusion index and firms’ access to finance, while 
controlling for firm-specific characteristics. WBES contains an expansive array of economic data 
on 130,000 firms in 135 countries over the period 2002-12.24 We run the following estimations at 
the firm-level:  
c,k,t 0 1 , 2 , , , , c t c k t c k tF Financial Inclusion Xβ β β ε= + + +    (4) 
Where F is the rating of financing obstacle reported by firm k  in country c  at time t  and 
X  is a set of control variables, which include firm size (employee), a dummy variable for 
manufacturing firms, a dummy for the firms that are involved in exporting, dummy variables for 
government and foreign-owned firms, age of the firms in years, GDP growth rate and regional 
                                                 
24 See Love and Martínez Pería (2014) for details on this database. In addition, out of 86, we could only match 63 
countries’ financial inclusion indices with the WBES database for the period 2004-12.   
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dummies (see Table A2). We run an ordered probit model to estimate equation (4), as financing 
obstacle is a polychotomous dependent variable with natural order where higher values indicate 
greater financing constraints. It is expected that the greater the financial inclusion, the less 
financing constraints there would be for firms to get access to credit. In addition, following Love 
and Martínez Pería (2014), we also use an alternative measure of access to finance. In this case, 
we construct an indicator variable that takes one if firm k  in country c  at time t  has a bank loan, 
line of credit, or overdraft.25 A positive relationship between financial inclusion index and access 
to finance is expected as greater inclusive financial system would alleviate financing constraints 
disbursing more credits to firms.    
The findings confirm the expectation that firms tend to report lower (higher) financial 
constraints (access) in those countries where financial inclusion is greater. In particular, we find 
that financing obstacles are negatively related to inclusive financial system, whereas access to 
finance is positively associated at 1% significance level. Therefore, it once again assures the 
robustness of our index.  
3.3 Measuring bank competition 
Lerner index is used to measure the degree of bank competition. It is considered to be the 
most accurate measure of bank-specific competition than the so-called Panzar-Rosse H-statistics 
or the asset shares of the three largest banks (Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009). The essence of pricing 
power is reflected through Lerner index because it measures the gap between price and marginal 
cost expressed as a percentage of price. In other words, it captures the degree to which a bank can 
                                                 
25 Since there is some disparity between the Old (2002-2005) and the New core modules of the surveys, we follow 
BDM (2007) to construct Financing Obstacle, and Love and Martínez-Peria (2014) to construct Access to Finance.  
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increase the price beyond its marginal cost. According to Berger et al. (2009), the Lerner index is 
the only measure of market power calculated at bank level as:   
it it
it
it
P MCLerner
P
−
=   (5) 
Where itP  is the price of total assets proxied by the ratio of total revenue (interest and non-
interest income) to total assets for bank i  at time t . itMC  is the marginal cost of producing an 
additional unit of output. The Lerner index is interpreted as inverse of competition; the higher the 
index, the greater is the pricing power implying less competitive market conditions. Following 
conventional bank efficiency studies, in this paper we use stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to 
estimate marginal cost and hence Lerner Index (as explained in online Appendix).  
3.4 Bank-specific and macro control variables 
We control for an array of standard bank-specific characteristics and macroeconomic 
variables. To account for liquidity risk of individual banks, we use ratio of total loans over total 
assets (Loan ratio) (Fang et al., 2014). We use logarithm of total assets (Bank size) to account for 
potential size effect on banking stability, as the too-big-to-fail attitude can destabilize the efficient 
financial intermediation of the entire banking system. The ratio of loan loss provision to total loans 
(Loan loss provision) is used to account for individual bank’s loan portfolio risk. The ambiguous 
effect of off-balance sheet activities of individual banks on stability necessitates considering the 
ratio of non-interest income to total operating income (Income diversification). The ratio of total 
earning assets to total assets (Management quality) is used as better management quality that can 
mitigate excessive risk-taking. Since well-capitalised banks are assumed to take less risk, we use 
the equity ratio (Capitalisation) to control for capital risk. In this paper, we also use several 
macroeconomic variables to control for economic development and business cycle of the economy. 
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Since, in the last decade, World economies observed substantial volatility, we use GDP to control 
for economic growth (GDP growth rate). As economic development generally coincides with an 
increase in financial inclusion, it is crucial to control for per capita GDP (GDP per capita) when 
assessing the association between financial inclusion and bank stability. Honohan (2008) argues 
that it would be interesting to see whether the impact of financial inclusion remains significant 
after controlling for per capita GDP. We also include the credit-to-deposit (CD) ratio – an 
important indicator of financial intermediation – as a control variable, as it reflects whether the 
supply of funds from depositors is being channeled to borrowers by the banks. 
3.5. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. The mean 
value of ln(Z-score) is 3.63 with a standard deviation of 1.05, implying that on average ROA would 
have to fall by 3.63 times their standard deviation to wipe out bank equity. The fairly high standard 
deviation suggests that there is considerable cross-country variation in the level of bank stability. 
The mean of negative logarithm of return volatility, -ln(sd(ROA)), is 5.90. For the variable of 
interest, the mean of the financial inclusion index is 0.33, where financial outreach and usage 
dimensions are 0.30 and 0.35, respectively. The standard deviation of 0.25 indicates considerable 
heterogeneity in the inclusiveness of financial systems across our broad sample of 86 countries.  
Table 2 reports the countries in our sample, ranked according to our index of financial 
inclusion. In terms of financial inclusion, South Korea (0.99), Belgium (0.98) and Japan (0.98) 
have the highest inclusive banking system, whereas Afghanistan (0.01), Yemen (0.02) and Malawi 
(0.03) have the lowest. On average, European countries have the highest financial inclusion (0.52), 
whereas African countries have the lowest value of 0.11. The average financial inclusion and 
banking stability of Asian and American countries are almost identical, while there is disparity of 
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individual constituents across countries. For example:  Ukraine ranks 13 in financial inclusion 
index but it ranks 40 in financial outreach and 5 in usage dimension. Therefore, using individual 
dimension as a proxy for financial inclusion would provide incomprehensive picture of a country’s 
overall inclusiveness.26  
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Is financial inclusion good for bank stability? 
First, we examine the impact of financial inclusion on bank stability using bank-level data. 
Our main dependent variable is the ln(Z-score), and the key independent variables are the financial 
inclusion index, and its two constituents – financial outreach and usage dimensions. Specifically, 
we conduct the baseline regression analysis as follows: 
, , (  ,   ,   )i j j i j jBank stability f Financial inclusion Bank characteristics Country characteristics=   (6) 
Where i  and j  subscripts indicate bank and country, respectively. Bank stability is 
logarithm of Z-score (henceforth as Z-score), measured at bank level. α  is constant, and kβ  is a 
vector of parameters. The financial inclusion is based on the weighted average of financial 
outreach and usage dimensions, measuring the level of inclusiveness of the financial sector of a 
country as defined in Section 3. It is calculated as the average measure over the sample period (see 
Allen et al., 2014). Individual constituents of the financial inclusion index are also used to see the 
impact of each dimensions on bank stability. Bank controls include Loan ratio, Bank size, Loan 
                                                 
26 Since financial inclusion is generally related to per capita income, these two variables tend to be correlated. The 
unreported correlation matrix of the independent variables used in this paper shows a positive correlation between per 
capita GDP and financial inclusion which further proves the robustness of our index (see Honohan, 2008). We 
computed the variance inflation factors (VIF) for each of our model estimates. VIF is equal to 1/ (1-r2), where r2 is 
from the regression of an independent variable on rest of the independent variables. The average VIF never exceeds 
3, indicating that multicollinearity is not a cause of concern for our results (Anginer et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
following previous studies on the determinants of financial development (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997; Beck et al., 2003), 
as a robustness test we exclude per capita GDP in all estimations and the results are broadly consistent with the main 
findings of this study. The results are available from the authors upon request.   
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loss provision, Income diversification, Management quality, Capitalisation, and Market power.27 
Section 3 and Table A1 include detailed definitions of these variables. The macro controls include 
GDP growth rate and natural logarithm of per capita GDP. In our baseline regressions, all 
variables are averaged over the period 2004-12.28 The main advantage of averaging data over the 
sample period is that it allows us to smooth variables that vary over time (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
2004; Barth et al., 2013b). Furthermore, following Beck et al. (2007b) and Houston et al. (2010), 
we use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country level to calculate t-
statistics. Clustering standard errors at the country-level allows observations to be independent 
across countries, which restrict error terms to be correlated for banks within the same countries 
due to omitted country characteristics. Since expanding access of the low yield clienteles to basic 
financial services may have negative impact on the bottom line of banks, it is natural to check 
robustness of our results using income volatility of individual banks as an alternative measure of 
bank stability. Therefore, (negative) logarithm of standard deviation of return-on-assets (ROA) is 
used as an alternative dependent variable. 
The results are presented in Table 3. For each of the specification, it is clear from the results 
that more inclusive financial system is associated with greater banking stability, as indicated by its 
positive and significant (at 1% level) coefficients (once again, a greater estimated Z-score indicates 
more stability, i.e., less risk taking). Given the mean Z-score of 3.63, the effect is not only 
statistically significant but also economically important. Since we use the natural logarithm of Z-
score, the coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticity. In column 1, a one standard deviation 
                                                 
27 We calculate average measure of all variables over the sample period. We use lagged values of Lerner indices to 
mitigate any endogeneity issues that may be associated with market power and stability (see e.g., Turk Ariss, 2010; 
Love and Martínez Pería, 2014). We also create a country-level market power variable, and re-run all regressions; the 
results remain unchanged and are available upon request.  
28 Initially, taking a balanced panel of our sample, we applied the cross-sectional dependence (CD) test proposed by 
Pesaran (2004). The CD test rejects the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence with an average absolute 
correlation of 0.367, suggesting the presence of cross-sectional dependence.  
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increase in the index of financial inclusion, which equals 0.25, is associated with an increase in 
the Z-score of 14% (0.56*0.25). The effect is economically important as it suggests that financial 
inclusion enhances soundness of individual banks. In particular, inclusive financial sector may 
enable banks to garner adequate cheap retail deposits from a large clientele base. Furthermore, it 
may also alleviate financing constraints of SMEs and also mitigate the post-lending moral hazard 
and asset substitutions problems. Therefore, with inclusive financial sector, banks enjoy greater 
financial stability. To illustrate the effect, we compare the improvement in the banking stability of 
two countries with different levels of financial inclusion (i.e., at the 25th and 75th of the index). 
Take the example of column 1. The estimation suggests that banks in Colombia (25th Percentiles; 
ranks 42 in our sample) would be 27% more stable if it has the financial inclusion of Switzerland 
(75th Percentiles; ranks 7 in our sample). Considering two individual dimensions of our index 
separately, we also find that greater bank branch outreach and a financial system with greater 
access to bank accounts per capita seem to increase bank stability. This result also corroborates 
with the additional risk measures used in this study. The negative of return volatility –
log(sd(ROA)), in columns 4-6, is also positively related to financial inclusion index and its 
associated dimensions, suggesting that higher level of financial inclusion reduces return volatility 
of banks.  
These results are consistent with the view that a system with inclusive financial services 
tends to reinforce banking stability (e.g., Han and Melecky, 2013; Khan, 2011; Morgan and 
Pontines, 2014) and that higher degree of financial inclusion mitigates excessive risk-taking of an 
individual bank. This result is also supported by Agarwal and Hauswald (2007) and DeYoung et 
al. (2008), who use US data and find that loan default probability increases with the distance 
between lender and borrowers. Recent empirical evidence also finds positive impact of geographic 
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diversification on reducing distance between banks and borrowers (e.g., Berger and DeYoung, 
2001; Bos and Kolari, 2005; Deng and Elyasiani, 2008; Rossi et al., 2009).  
 Our results on control variables are also consistent with existing literature. As might be 
expected, banks with better management, higher equity capital and pricing power are more stable 
as opposed to banks with higher loan loss provision.29 Both country-level macro controls are 
statistically insignificant. However, the sign of the coefficient suggests that banks engage in more 
risk-taking if the economic growth is high. However, they indulge in less risk-taking when they 
operate in countries where the level of economic development is high.  
The robustness of the main results is checked using numerous sensitivity tests. First, we 
use quantile regression estimates to examine the effects on conditional distribution of Z-score. 
Second, we use an array of instruments to address the potential endogeneity problem while using 
two stage cross-sectional IV estimations. Finally, we use dynamic GMM panel model to exploit 
bank-specific unobserved time invariant heterogeneity and also control for time fixed effects.  
4.2. Robustness tests: Quantile regression estimates 
So far, we have used OLS estimator, and found a robust link between financial inclusion 
and bank soundness.30 It should be noted that the OLS estimator is based only on the central 
tendency of probability distributions, which restricts anyone to examine the link between the 
regressors and the outcome variable in non-central regions. Consequently, our results from OLS 
regressions might have provided only a partial view of the relation between financial inclusion and 
                                                 
29 We use squared term of bank size and find that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between bank size and 
bank risk taking.  
30 One concern is that our results may be swayed by the dominanceof large banks in some countries or by the large 
number of banks in a few important countries. To address these issues, we re-estimate the results using weighted OLS 
regressions (the results are weighted first, by bank assets and second, by total number of banks in each country). The 
unreported results remain unchanged with somewhat higher values of the estimated coefficients. Furthermore, Japan 
and Italy constitute a lion share of our sample. Re-estimating regressions by dropping these two countries also does 
not alter our main findings (unreported). The results are available upon request. 
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bank soundness. Furthermore, as we include a large number of banks from different countries, 
heterogeneity may be a cause of concern in our sample. Therefore, we examine whether our 
measure of financial inclusion index has a homogeneous impact on bank soundness while 
illustrating the relationship at different points in the conditional distribution of the dependent 
variable. To accomplish this, we use quantile regression (hereafter, QR) approach, as introduced 
by Koenker and Bassett (1978). While OLS estimators are sensitive to non-normal errors, QR 
results are robust to modest deviation from normality and outliers. QR also provides a 
comprehensive characterisation of the sample, allowing us to examine the impact of financial 
inclusion on the entire distribution of Z-score.  
Table 4 presents the results of QR estimates. As the Z-score changes across quantiles, the 
estimate of the financial inclusion index varies widely in sign, magnitude, and significance. For 
instance, at 5% significance level, while the estimates of the financial inclusion coefficients are 
significantly positive for Z-score at quantiles from 0.40 and above, they become insignificant for 
those between 0.2 and 0.3, and then turn negative (insignificant) for those 0.1 and below, implying 
that inclusive financial sector enhances soundness of more stable banks. It should be noted that the 
result of the least absolute deviation (i.e., 50th quantile) estimate is also consistent with the OLS 
regressions. F tests of the equality-of-slope parameters across various quantiles are reported at the 
bottom of Table 4. These parameters show the differences between slope estimates at the θ against 
(1-θ) quantiles. The comparison of parameters shows that differences across banks in various Z-
score quantiles are significant at 1% level for all quantiles.  
4.3. Robustness tests: instrumental variable analysis 
Endogeneity is a common identification problem in any cross-country study. Possible 
reverse causality might arise if banks engage in risky activities in the current set-up and venture 
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into rural areas to offset high risk and/or if they self-select into inclusive financial activities 
because these reward them with more retail deposits and cost reduction. In our analysis, the 
potential for reverse causality might be less of a concern as we investigate the impact of a country-
level indicator – financial inclusion on bank-level stability. However, we conduct a sensitivity test 
using an instrumental variable (IV) technique.  
To address any potential endogeneity problem, we search extensively for instrumental 
variables and base the selection of IVs on the recent empirical studies on financial inclusion and 
financial development (Beck et al., 2007b; Aker and Mbiti, 2010; Mbiti and Weil, 2011; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012; Allen et al., 2014).31 Beck et al. (2007b) argue that better 
communication infrastructure reduce the cost of banking service delivery and makes the 
broadening of bank branches more cost effective. Allen et al. (2014) show how technological 
advances, such as mobile phone use, can help overcome infrastructural deficiencies to broaden 
financial inclusion in Sub-Saharan Africa. Such technological innovation has enabled many 
countries, especially with limited physical and financial infrastructure, to expedite inclusive 
financial development agenda via Mobile money transfer (“m-transfer”) systems. M-transfer 
systems help users, especially underserved people, to execute financial transactions via mobile 
handsets. Using mobile handsets users can get access to basic financial services allowing them to 
deposit and withdraw cash from an account. M-transfer systems also allow users to transfer money 
to each other via text messages, menu commands, and personal identification numbers (Aker and 
                                                 
31 We also base the selection of our instrumental variables on the theoretical and empirical studies in the law, 
institutions, and finance literature (Easterly and Levine, 1997; La Porta et al., 1998; Beck et al., 2003; Acemoglu and 
Johnson, 2005). In this effort, we use English and German legal origins as instrumental variables for financial inclusion 
using data from La Porta et al. (1999): it is argued that the historical legal differences around the world determine the 
present day’s financial systems internationally.  Following the endowment theory, we use latitude and ethnic 
fractionalization as one of the instruments for financial inclusion as well (see Beck et al., 2003). Our results remain 
significant and unchanged, which are available from the authors.  
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Mbiti, 2010). As a result, m-transfer systems empower users to make financial transactions at a 
relatively low cost across much wider geographic areas than is possible using localized informal 
payment solutions (Beck and Cull, 2013). Aker et al. (2011) report that, since 2005, almost 80 
developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have established m-transfer systems. In 
this case, we assume that the share of mobile cellular subscription in other neighboring countries 
in the same geographical region is likely to impact inclusive financial development of a country. 
We, therefore, collect data on Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) of 86 countries for 
our sample period. Specifically, the instrumental variable   Mobile phone share in geographical 
region j  for country i  reflecting neighborhood effect is measured as follows:32  
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The measure of Mobile phone share is based on how large mobile cellular subscriptions 
are in the neighboring countries. This captures the intuition that countries that have large mobile 
cellular subscriptions in the same geographical region are more likely to increase their mobile 
cellular transactions, and hence facilitate a large number of underbanked people to be included in 
the formal financial sector via m-transfer systems. We have followed the regional classification of 
World Bank to determine whether countries are in the same region. These regions are East Asia 
and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North 
Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. We treat High income countries as a separate region. 
 The next instrument that we have used in the study is collected from the Global Findex 
database 2011. Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper (2012) found that family and friends are the most 
                                                 
32 Since, m-transfer systems facilitate remittance transfer across countries, the share of Mobile cellular subscriptions 
in other countries in the same region can help extract the exogenous components of the variables of interest in this 
study. Using data of 109 developing countries for the period 1975-2007, Aggarwal et al. (2011) find evidence of a 
positive, significant, and robust association between remittances and financial development. 
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commonly reported source of new loans in developing countries. According to the recent wave of 
the Global Findex Survey, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015) reported that, overall in developing 
countries, 29 percent of adults borrowed from family or friends, while only 9 percent borrowed 
from a financial institution. Therefore, we have used the percentage of adults borrowing from 
family or friends as an instrument in the IV regression. The intuition to use this variable as an 
instrument is because of the fact that the higher percentage of adults borrowing from friends or 
family would influence the level of financial inclusion in a country (see Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Klapper, 2012; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015), but it should not have any direct influence on the 
bank-level stability. Countries with higher level of informal borrowing will have lower level of 
financial inclusion in the formal banking sector. Also we follow Houston et al. (2010) and use 
religious composition as the final instrument for our IV regression. 
We test the validity of our instrumental variables using the under-identification LM test by 
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) and the over-identification test by Hansen (1982). The results on these 
tests show that the instruments used are valid as the p-value of the former (latter) requires a value 
lower (higher) than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. The results of the first-stage 
regressions of financial inclusion on instruments are presented in Table A3. The results show that 
while greater mobile phone share increases the level of financial inclusion, the percentage of adults 
borrowed from family or friends reduces it, whereas religion enhances the usage of financial 
services.   
The second-stage results are reported in Table 5. The empirical results of the instrumental 
variable regressions are rather robust. The coefficient of financial inclusion index, financial 
outreach and usage remain positive and significant in all specifications, including with the negative 
return volatility. The results confirm our finding that more inclusive financial sector or greater 
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banking sector outreach or greater usage of financial services enhances bank stability. The results 
on other control variables are also qualitatively similar. The magnitudes of the coefficients of IV 
estimates are relatively larger than the ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients, indicating the 
existence of potential measurement error, which tend to attenuate coefficients downward. Though 
after instrumentation, the magnitude and significance of the coefficients are relatively higher, the 
results of our regressions should be interpreted as an association not as causal relationships.    
4.4. Alternative financial inclusion index 
The financial inclusion index is constructed as a combination of geographic and 
demographic availability of branches and ATMs, as well as the usage of bank accounts in a 
country. Although we construct financial inclusion index incorporating as many dimension as 
possible given the data availability constraints, it is possible that our results are inferred incorrectly 
because of poorly constructed index. Therefore, we use alternative financial inclusion index that 
is taken from the Global Findex Database, which collects information on how people in 148 
countries manage their financial activities. The variables we use as the financial inclusion proxy 
are the percentage of adults that had an account or savings at a financial institution in the year prior 
to the survey (see e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013b; Allen et al., 2014). This database is new and 
just covers the year 2011.33 As inclusive financial agenda may influence many policies, and many 
other factors may also jointly affect polices and financial inclusion, following Allen et al. (2016), 
we run two-stage cross-sectional instrumental variable regressions.34 The regression results are 
presented in Table 6, showing that the relationship between Global Findex and bank stability is 
                                                 
33 In 2015, Global Findex database has released second wave survey results on financial inclusion. We did not 
incorporate financial indicators from this survey as bank-level data are yet to be updated by BankScope.  
34 We use religious composition and ethnic fractionalization (see Houston et al., 2010) as instruments. The results of 
first-stage regressions are available upon request from the authors.  
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positive and statistically significant, implying that more people having accounts or savings with 
formal financial institutions enhance bank soundness, corroborating our earlier findings. 
4.6. Split samples based on financial inclusion and developing countries 
We conduct a battery of sensitivity checks using different sample selection criteria such as 
splitting samples based on financial inclusion index and also excluding developed countries. First, 
we split our sample into three terciles according to the financial inclusion index and re-run three 
separate regressions.35 The results are reported in Table 7 (column 1-3). The low, medium and 
high terciles of financial inclusion are instrumented using the analogous instruments. The result 
indicates that the effect of financial inclusion at all terciles is positive and significant with bank 
stability. However, we can see that the magnitude of the coefficients of the highest terciles 
increases substantially, supporting our argument that greater inclusive financial sector is good for 
bank stability. Finally, we also drop all banks of the developed countries keeping only 934 banks 
that operate in developing countries, and re-run the regressions. The result corroborates our earlier 
findings, suggesting that inclusive financial system is not only a development goal but also it helps 
improving soundness of banks operating in developing countries. We also find a positive and 
significant relation between financial inclusion and bank stability for the sample of developed 
countries. However, the magnitude of the coefficients of financial inclusion suggests that inclusive 
finance might be a developing countries’ phenomenon, which brings more benefits to their bank 
stability.36 
                                                 
35 The summary statistics of the group with the lowest financial inclusion index has an average (median) bank stability 
(Z-score) of 56.6 (38.7), the group with the medium financial inclusion index has an average (median) bank stability 
of 82.9 (60.3), and the group with the highest financial inclusion index has an average (median) bank stability of 137.4 
(71.7). 
36 Our main results also remain unchanged for the following robustness tests: (i) using bank activity restrictions as a 
control, gathered from the bank regulation databases (Barth et al., 2013a); (ii) controlling for individual bank’s 
ownership status, collected from (Claessens and Van Horen, 2014, 2015); (iii) controlling for off-balance sheet items, 
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4.8. Robustness tests: Dynamic panel model 
So far, we run cross-sectional regressions without exploiting panel dimensions of our data. 
Exploiting panel structure of the data enables us to eradicate the unobserved time-invariant bank-
specific heterogeneity. In this section, we use the two-step system generalized method of moments 
(SYS-GMM) estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) while specifying the robust 
estimator of the variance-covariance matrix. We choose to use SYS-GMM to address at least three 
important econometric issues in the paper: (i) taking the first differences of the explanatory 
variables eliminate the presence of unobserved bank-specific effects; (ii) using lags of the 
explanatory variables to eliminate any related plausible endogeneity; and (iii) using a lagged 
dependent variable model to capture the dynamic nature of the level of financial inclusion and 
bank stability.37 In particular, we use lags for all explanatory variables. Using SYS-GMM, we are 
able to estimate a system of two simultaneous equations: one in levels where lagged first 
differences are used as instruments and the other in first differences where lagged levels are used 
as instruments – this approach maximises the efficiency of the estimates with increased moment 
conditions (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). To 
test the validity of the instruments, we use the Hansen (1982) test of over-identifying restrictions 
with a null hypothesis that there is no correlation between instrumental variables and residual. We 
also use Arellano-Bond (AR) test with a null hypothesis that there is no second-order 
autocorrelation. 
  
                                                 
defined as a ratio of off-balance sheet as a percentage of total assets. The results of all these estimations are available 
upon request. 
37 We prefer SYS-GMM over other panel model estimators (e.g., fixed effects or random effects) as it enables us to 
alleviate the strict exogeneity assumption for explanatory variables and helps incorporating lagged dependent variable 
in the model. 
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Table 8 reports the results of the SYS-GMM model. While the Arellano-Bond test confirms 
that there is no second-order serial correlation, the Hansen test confirms that the over-
instrumentation problem is mimimised in all regressions.  Even after exploiting for time-series 
variation in the measure of financial inclusion in a panel set up, we find a positive and significant 
association between financial inclusion and bank-level stability. The results with the associated 
dimensions of financial inclusion index also remain unchanged. Specifically, the coefficients of 
financial inclusion indicators are positive and significant at 1% level with bank stability, indicating 
a robust association between financial inclusion and bank stability. 
4.9. The effects of financial inclusion after the global financial crisis 
So far, we find a strong association between financial inclusion and bank stability for the 
period 2004-12. However, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis that took place in 2008, 
the leaders of the Group of Twenty (G20) recognised the mutually reinforcing policy objectives of 
financial inclusion, stability and consumer protection.38 They committed to increase access of the 
disadvantaged groups to financial services through principles for innovative financial inclusion. 
Therefore, we assume that the relationship between financial inclusion and bank stability might be 
stronger for the post-crisis period (i.e., 2008-12) compared to the pre-crisis one (i.e., 2004-07). We 
divided our sample into pre- and post-crisis periods and re-run equation (6) while using analogous 
controls. Table 9 shows the results, confirming that the relationship between financial inclusion 
and bank stability is more pronounced for the post-crisis period compared to pre-crisis one.  
  
5. Exploring channels: share of retail deposits, marginal cost, and institutional quality 
                                                 
38 http://www.afi-global.org/sites/default/files/afi%20g20%20principles.pdf 
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Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) show that banks with high level of non-deposit 
funding share take excessive risk. Accordingly, if bank’s funding strategy is a factor for risk taking, 
one would expect the positive relation between financial inclusion and bank stability to be more 
prominent with the banks that have high retail deposit funding. We borrow the idea from 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), but measure our deposit funding indicator as the share of 
customer deposit over customer and short-term deposit funding from BankScope (see Section 2 
for details). The dummy variable, HIGH deposit funding share, indicates banks that have business 
model focusing more on deposit funding from customers (i.e., high-deposit-funding banks) with a 
deposit funding indicator that is higher than the sample mean. The variable, LOW deposit funding 
share, captures low-deposit-funding banks or banks that focus less on customer deposits and 
equals one minus HIGH deposit funding share. We create two interaction terms between financial 
inclusion measures and these dummy variables, HIGH deposit funding share and LOW deposit 
funding share. The intuition is to delineate the effects of financial inclusion in high-deposit-
funding banks as opposed to low-deposit-funding banks. We augment the baseline model by 
replacing the financial inclusion measure with the interaction terms Financial inclusion × HIGH 
deposit funding share and Financial inclusion × LOW deposit funding share and by adding the 
dummy variable HIGH deposit funding share as an additional independent variable. Financial 
inclusion is Financial inclusion index, Financial outreach, or Usage. Using analogous control 
variables, we re-estimate our revised model using OLS regression while calculating 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Table 10, Panel A, reports 
the results of this analysis. In general, we find that the coefficients on the financial inclusion 
measures are all positive. Put differently, there is no evidence of a significant negative financial 
inclusion-stability relation. In particular, the coefficients (β1) on the interaction term Financial 
 34 
inclusion × HIGH deposit funding share are significant in all cases except Usage dimension, 
indicating a positive inclusive financial sector effect on bank soundness with high-deposit-funding 
banks.39 The coefficients (β2) on the other interaction term, Financial inclusion × LOW deposit 
funding share are insignificant in all cases and even negative for Usage dimension. Furthermore, 
according to the Chow tests, we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of these interaction 
terms are similar (i.e., β1 = β2). All these empirical findings imply that deposit funding share is a 
plausible channel through which financial inclusion affects bank stability.  
Likewise, if banks attract more diversified funds due to inclusive financial system, it should 
reduce their marginal cost of production (with reduced marginal costs, banks can inflate market 
power, see Equation 5). Therefore, on the one hand, banks with high marginal costs should be less 
active in broadening access to finance and hence become less stable as opposed to banks with low 
marginal costs. On the other hand, banks with high market power should be more active in 
broadening access to finance and hence become more stable as opposed to banks with low market 
power. Recent studies show that market power plays a key role in broadening financial access 
(e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Beck et al., 2004; Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009; Chong et al., 2013; 
Love and Martínez Pería, 2014; Ryan et al., 2014). The information hypothesis argues that greater 
market power may persuade banks to establish relationship lending and internalise benefits of 
supporting informationally opaque or risky customers, and hence lead to more credit availability 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Di Patti and Dell'Ariccia, 2004).40 From this line of argument, it is 
obvious that banks can take advantage of possessing more public information, and thus extend 
                                                 
39 Recently, Han and Melecky (2013) find international evidence for the period 2006-10 that, by dint of the law of 
large number, correlated deposit withdrawals (i.e., bank run) could be mitigated during stressful times if bank deposits 
are more diversified i.e., held by more individuals and firms. 
40 On the other hand, based on the traditional industrial organisation theory, the market power hypothesis argues that 
higher competition results in more loan supply ensuring lower lending rates, thereby improving credit availability 
(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004; Carbó-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez and Udell, 2009; Ryan, 
O’Toole and McCann, 2014). 
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access of firms/households to credit via the channel of reduced marginal costs. Using the similar 
procedures as above, we categorise high-marginal-cost banks as those with a greater cost of 
production that is higher than the sample mean of our marginal cost variable. We use the dummy 
variables HIGH marginal costs and LOW marginal costs to indicate high-marginal-cost banks and 
low-marginal-cost banks. Additionally, we also categorise high-market-power banks as those with 
a greater pricing power that is higher than the sample mean of our market power variable. We use 
the dummy variables HIGH market power and LOW market power to indicate high-market-power 
banks and low-market-power. We re-estimate our revised model as above, and while we report 
results of the interaction of financial inclusion with marginal costs in Panel B, market power results 
are reported in Panel C of Table 10. Similarly, the coefficients (β1) on the interaction term 
Financial inclusion × HIGH marginal costs are insignificant in all cases, and even negative with 
Usage dimension. The coefficients (β2) on the other interaction term, Financial inclusion × LOW 
marginal cost, are significant in all cases, indicating a positive inclusive financial sector effects on 
bank soundness with low-marginal-cost banks. Regarding market power, while the coefficients 
(β1) on the interaction term Financial inclusion × HIGH market power are significant in all cases 
except usage dimension, suggesting a positive inclusive financial sector effect on bank soundness 
with high-market-power banks, the coefficients (β2) on the other interaction term, Financial 
inclusion × LOW market power are insignificant in all cases except financial outreach dimension. 
Based on the Chow tests, we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of these interaction 
terms are similar (i.e., β1 = β2). These empirical exercises also suggest that market power via 
marginal costs is a plausible channel through which financial inclusion affects bank stability. 
By the same token, the impact of greater financial inclusion may depend on institutional 
environment in which a bank operates, and can potentially be fortified through better institutional 
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quality. For example, better rule of law may limit the extent to which banks can engage in 
correlated risk taking activities where the financial inclusion is even low. We use Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) Governance Indices: Voice and accountability; Political stability; Government 
effectiveness; Regulatory quality; Rule of law; and Control of corruption. As these indicators are 
highly correlated, we capture common variation among these indicators using the principal 
component analysis and construct a composite index of institutional quality (the only PC with 
eigenvalue more than one i.e., 5.32 and with 89% variation). Following exactly same procedures 
described above, this time, we classify strong-institutional-quality countries as those with a high 
level of institutional environment that is higher than the sample mean of institutional quality index. 
We also follow same procedures as above and re-estimate the revised baseline model. The results 
of this analysis are presented in Panel D of Table 10. Again, while the coefficients (β1) on the 
interaction term Financial inclusion × HIGH institutional quality are significantly positive, the 
coefficients (β2) on Financial inclusion × LOW institutional quality, are insignificant. According 
to Wald test, rejecting the null hypothesis also demonstrates that these coefficients are dissimilar 
(i.e., β1 ≠ β2), indicating that institutional quality is a plausible channel through which financial 
inclusion affects bank stability. 
We subject our findings to a series of additional sensitivity checks. The results are robust 
to (i) using Quantile regression approach, (ii) using instrumental variable approach, (iii) using 
alternative measures of financial inclusion that are taken from Global Findex database, (iv) running 
regressions only for the sample of developing countries, and finally (iv) using dynamic GMM 
panel model. For all of these alternative setups, the main findings of this study largely remain 
unaltered. 
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6. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
Financial inclusion, as documented in the literature, brings about more economic wellbeing 
to individuals and SMEs. Yet, little is known about its impact on stability of banks who are the 
main arbiters of financial services in any given economy. Using an international sample of 2600 
banks across 86 countries, we provide a comprehensive empirical evidence that greater financial 
inclusion is positively associated with individual bank stability. In this paper, we have also 
identified, for the first time, the channels through which financial inclusion impacts bank 
soundness. These results suggest that banks perceive financial inclusion as a mechanism to garner 
ample risk-free and mostly cheap retail deposits, providing a significant leeway to reduce reliance 
on volatile and often costly money market funding. Increasing financial inclusion also act as an 
instrument to reduce marginal cost of producing outputs, which contributes to greater pricing 
power of banks and makes them more stable. As greater financial inclusion promotes stable socio-
political environments, banks operating in an inclusive financial sector and in countries with high 
levels of institutional quality can improve stability as they get to operate efficiently in those 
settings.  
Our results have important policy implications. The findings suggest that banking stability 
is strongly influenced by the degree to which households and SMEs have access to financial 
services, indicating the importance of ensuring an inclusive financial sector for achieving inclusive 
economic growth. By broadening banking services to unbanked and/or underbanked people, bank 
managers can not only take early advantage of exploiting the untapped potential of customers and 
create a ‘lock-in’ effect but also aid an inclusive development agenda while allocating resources 
in more productive areas.41 As only 41% people in the developing countries compared to 89% in 
                                                 
41 Klemperer (1995) argues that in a market with switching costs, a firm’s future profitability is determined by its 
current market share. Increasing market share at an early stage associated with financial inclusion, efficient bank 
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developed ones have bank accounts (see Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012), additional policies 
should focus on ensuring access to those excluded from formal financial services, especially in the 
developing ones. In the end, however, only more empirical research using both supply- and 
demand-side data on access will provide comprehensive picture of the effects of financial inclusion 
on bank stability.   
 
Online Appendix 
See supplementary material. 
Appendix A 
Table A1 
Variables definitions and sources 
Variable Definitions Source 
Dependent Variables 
  
Z-score Sum of return-on-assets (ROA), defined as net profit over assets, and equity ratio (EQA), defined as equity 
over assets, divided by standard deviation of (ROA) of each bank over past three years (calculated using a 
rolling window) 
BankScope 
Volatility of ROA Standard deviation of ROA for each bank, calculated over past 3 years BankScope 
Financial Inclusion 
  
Financial inclusion index Financial inclusion index is constructed using PCA from the financial outreach and usage dimensions. IMF FAS 
Financial outreach 
dimension 
The outreach dimension constructed using principal component analysis (PCA) from the variables related to 
geographic and demographic availability of branches and ATMs 
MF FAS 
Usage dimension The number of deposit and loan accounts per 1000 adults MF FAS 
Bank-specific variables 
  
Bank size Logarithm of Total assets BankScope 
Loan ratio Total performing loans divided by total assets BankScope 
Loan loss provision Total loan loss provision divided by total assets BankScope 
Income diversification  Non-interest income divided by total operating income BankScope 
Management quality Total earning assets divided by total assets BankScope 
Capitalisation Total equity divided by total assets BankScope 
Market power A bank-level non-structural indicator of bank competition, measured by using a stochastic frontier analysis 
approach assuming full bank efficiency, with lower values indicating higher competition in the banking sector 
Authors’ 
calculation 
Marginal costs Marginal cost is estimated using a translog costs function Authors’ 
 Customer deposit 
funding share (CDEP) 
Share of customer deposits of total deposits and short-term funding. BankScope 
Firm-specific variables 
  
Access to finance Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has access to bank finance (loan, overdraft or line of credit) WBES 
Financing Obstacle  Financing obstacle is defined on five point scale how problematic is financing for the operation and growth of 
business: (0) No obstacle (1) minor obstacle (2) moderate obstacle (3) major obstacle, and (4) very severe 
obstacle. 
WBES 
Firm size (employees) The number of permanent full-time employees WBES 
Manufacturing Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in the manufacturing sector WBES 
Exporter Dummy variable equal to 1 if 10 percent or more of sales are exported directly or indirectly by the firm WBES 
Foreign-owned Dummy variable equal to 1 if 50 percent or more of the firm is owned by foreign organisations WBES 
Government-owned Dummy variable equal to 1 if 10 percent or more of the firm is owned by the government WBES 
Firm age Age of the firm in years WBES 
Macroeconomic 
 
  
GDP growth rate The growth rate of GDP WDI 
                                                 
managers will be able to take advantage of its informational monopoly, and hence increase market power effectively 
while having a customer ‘lock-in’ effect.   
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GDP per capita The natural logarithm of per capita GDP WDI 
Institutional quality index Institutional quality index is constructed using principal component analysis by using Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi's (2010) Governance indicators (e.g., Voice and accountability: measures the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and free media (Higher values mean greater political rights); Political stability: 
measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including political violence and terrorism (Higher values mean more stable 
political environment); Government effectiveness: measures the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies (Higher values mean 
higher quality of public and civil service); Regulatory quality: measures the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote market competition and 
private-sector development (Higher values mean higher quality of regulation); Rule of law: measures the extent 
to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence (Higher values mean 
stronger law and order); and Control of corruption: measures the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘‘capture’’ of the state by elites and 
private interests (Higher values indicate better control of corruption).  
Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi 
(2010) 
IV Instruments 
  
Proportion of other 
countries in the same 
region that have mobile 
phone 
Proportion of other countries in the same region (e.g., Asia, Africa) that have mobile phone (per 100 people). WDI 
Religion Identifies the percentage of the population of each country that belonged to the three most widely spread 
religions in the world in 1980. For countries of recent formation, the data is available for 1990-95. The 
numbers are in percent (scale from 0 to 100). The three religions identified here are: (1) Roman Catholic; (2) 
Protestant; and (3) Muslim. The residual is called “other religions”. 
La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1999) 
Borrowed from family or 
friends (% age 15+) 
Borrowed money from family or friends (% age 15+) Demirguc-Kunt 
and 
Klapper (2012) 
Note: IMF FAS = International Monetary Fund Financial Access Survey; WBES = World Bank Enterprise Survey; WDI = World Development 
Indicator 
 
 
 
Table A2 
Inclusive financial system and firm financing obstacle or access to finance, firm level 
results 
We run ordered probit model when Financing Obstacle is the dependent variable and logit model for the case of 
Access to Finance. In both cases, robust standard errors are reported in the brackets. Both dependent variables are 
constructed using the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. In the case of former, firms were asked to rate on a five-point 
scale how much of an obstacle is access to finance for the operation and growth of the business: (0) No obstacle (1) 
minor obstacle (2) moderate obstacle (3) major obstacle (4) very severe obstacle. For the latter case, Access to Finance 
is a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm has access to a loan, overdraft, or a line of credit. The firm size is 
the logarithm of the firms’ total number of permanent employees. The dummy variable Exporter indicates that firms 
are involved in exporting. The Manufacturing dummy indicates that a firm is in the manufacturing sector. 
Government-owned and Foreign-owned are dummies that is equal one if the firm has government or foreign 
ownership, respectively. Log firm age is the logarithm of the firm’s age in years. GDP growth rate is the annual 
growth rate in percentage. Regional dummies are Sub-Sahara Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe, Americas, and South 
Asia, with the Middle East and North Africa being the omitted category. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys and WDI. Coverage: 2004-12. 
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Table A3 
First-stage regression: Financial inclusion 
This table reports regressions of financial inclusion and its associated dimensions on Mobile phone share in other 
countries in the region, Borrowed from family or friends, and Religion. All regressions include bank-specific and 
country-specific controls as in equation (6), except financial inclusion. P-values are calculated by the 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for countries and are presented in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
VARIABLES Financial 
inclusion index 
Financial 
outreach 
dimension 
Usage 
dimension 
  1 2 3 
Mobile phone share in other countries in the region 3.007*** 1.291** 5.424***  
[0.550] [0.539] [1.414] 
Borrowed from family or friends -0.003*** -0.007*** 
 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
 
Religion 
  
0.004***    
[0.000] 
Observations 2,439 2,439 2,564 
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.79 0.53 
All control variables Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES coef se coef seFinancial Inclusion -0.251*** [0.045] 0.491*** [0.019]Log firm size (employees) -0.047*** [0.004] 0.035*** [0.002]Exporter -0.027* [0.015] 0.123*** [0.006]Manufacturing 0.141*** [0.012] -0.033*** [0.005]Foreign-owned (>=50% shares) -0.247*** [0.020] -0.047*** [0.008]Government-owned (>=10% shares) -0.052 [0.037] -0.210*** [0.016]Log Firm Age -0.082*** [0.011] 0.079*** [0.005]GDP growth rate 0.002* [0.001] -0.012*** [0.001]
Region (Middle East & North Africa omitted)Sub-Sahara Africa 0.359*** [0.057] 0.098*** [0.022]Asia and Pacific -0.406*** [0.057] 0.113*** [0.022]Europe 0.208*** [0.059] 0.015 [0.025]Americas 0.164*** [0.057] 0.259*** [0.021]South Asia 0.229*** [0.067] 0.119*** [0.025]Observations 38,850 38,850No of countries 63 63chi2 2430*** 5006***Pseudo R-squared 0.02 0.11
Financing Obstacle Access to Finance
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max # of countries # of obs. 
Bank-level data 
      
ln(Z-score) 3.63 1.05 0.30 7.29 86 2635 
-ln(sd(ROA)) 5.90 1.17 1.77 10.45 86 2635 
Loan Ratio 0.55 0.19 0.00 0.99 86 2635 
Bank size 6.85 1.95 -1.96 14.59 86 2635 
Loan Loss Provision 0.01 0.03 -0.16 0.80 86 2635 
Income Diversification 0.18 0.28 -3.68 9.15 86 2635 
Management Quality 0.89 0.10 0.15 1.00 86 2635 
Capitalisation 0.12 0.09 0.01 0.85 86 2635 
Market power 0.07 0.29 -1.39 0.80 86 2635 
Marginal costs 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.29 86 2635 
Customer deposit funding share (CDEP) % 84.87 19.95 0.00 100.00 85 2302 
Firm-level data       
Access to finance 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 63 38850 
Financing Obstacle  1.54 1.36 0.00 4.00 63 38850 
Firm size (employees) 2.55 1.50 0.00 11.51 63 38850 
Manufacturing 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 63 38850 
Exporter 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 63 38850 
Foreign-owned 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 63 38850 
Government-owned 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 63 38850 
Firm age 3.01 0.55 0.69 5.37 63 38850 
Country-level data 
      
Financial inclusion index 0.33 0.25 0.02 1.00 86 86 
Financial outreach dimension 0.30 0.27 0.01 0.99 86 86 
Usage dimension 0.35 0.30 0.00 1.00 86 86 
GDP growth rate 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.11 86 86 
ln(Per capita GDP) 8.37 1.51 5.01 11.09 86 86 
Institutional quality index 0.50 0.23 0.01 1.00 86 86 
Instrumental variables 
      
Mobile phone share in other countries in the region* 0.99 0.01 0.89 1.00 84 84 
Religion (%) 31.47 33.33 0.40 100.00 84 84 
Borrowed from family or friends (% age 15+) 14.54 18.69 0.00 90.58 78 78 
*Information on these instruments are available for entire sample period (2004-12).      
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Table 2 
Bank stability, financial inclusion and its associated dimensions across countries 
Bank stability is the natural logarithm of Z-score. Financial inclusion index is constructed based on financial outreach and usage dimensions. Financial outreach dimension is 
based on geographic and demographic branch (ATM) penetration: the number of branches per 1,000 km2 and the number of ATMs per 1,000 km2; the number of branches per 
100,000 adults and the number of ATM per 100,000 adults. The usage dimension refers to the number of deposit and loan accounts per 1000 adults. The rank of each country 
is in the parenthesis: lower numbers reflecting higher values of the dimensions. 
Country ln(z-score) Financial 
inclusion index 
Financial 
outreach 
dimension 
Usage dimension # of banks Country ln(z-score) Financial 
inclusion index 
Financial 
outreach 
dimension 
Usage dimension # of banks 
Algeria 3.55 0.09(69) 0.03(81) 0.17(57) 12 India 4.05 0.32(38) 0.38(24) 0.24(50) 59 
Angola 3.1 0.05(75) 0.05(71) 0.06(68) 11 Indonesia 3.67 0.14(63) 0.10(66) 0.20(54) 58 
Botswana 3.1 0.15(62) 0.09(67) 0.21(53) 6 Japan 3.76 0.96(3) 0.92(3) 0.93(2) 453 
Burundi 2.84 0.03(81) 0.03(79) 0.02(76) 4 Jordan 3.94 0.21(55) 0.16(54) 0.26(46) 12 
Cameroon 3.17 0.03(82) 0.04(74) 0.01(80) 7 Kazakhstan 3 0.22(53) 0.12(63) 0.33(39) 26 
Egypt 3.31 0.08(71) 0.05(72) 0.11(61) 19 Kuwait 2.77 0.33(37) 0.30(31) 0.36(35) 12 
Ghana 3.03 0.07(73) 0.04(77) 0.10(63) 16 Lebanon 4.09 0.50(17) 0.54(17) 0.47(26) 30 
Kenya 3.6 0.07(74) 0.04(78) 0.10(64) 27 Malaysia 3.73 0.46(22) 0.22(45) 0.73(12) 5 
Libya 4.34 0.04(76) 0.05(73) 0.04(73) 5 Mongolia 3.28 0.38(33) 0.25(35) 0.53(23) 3 
Malawi 3.06 0.02(85) 0.02(82) 0.02(77) 5 Pakistan 2.98 0.07(72) 0.07(69) 0.07(67) 9 
Mauritius 3.33 0.63(9) 0.60(14) 0.67(14) 11 Philippines 3.51 0.13(64) 0.14(62) 0.12(60) 20 
Mozambique 2.67 0.04(79) 0.03(80) 0.04(72) 9 Saudi Arabia 3.61 0.23(51) 0.17(53) 0.29(42) 12 
Namibia 4.16 0.18(58) 0.11(65) 0.25(47) 6 Singapore 3.97 0.40(31) 0.76(10) 0.00(84) 12 
Rwanda 2.75 0.12(66) 0.15(58) 0.09(66) 7 South Korea 3.92 1.00(1) 0.99(1) 0.99(1) 10 
South Africa 3.47 0.21(54) 0.16(55) 0.28(45) 13 Thailand 3.51 0.37(35) 0.30(28) 0.46(27) 20 
Tanzania 3.22 0.03(83) 0.02(84) 0.04(71) 21 Turkey 3.66 0.42(27) 0.24(38) 0.62(18) 27 
Uganda 2.59 0.04(78) 0.02(83) 0.05(70) 14 United Arab 
 
3.69 0.25(45) 0.25(36) 0.25(48) 19 
Zambia 2.11 0.03(80) 0.04(76) 0.02(78) 10 Uzbekistan 3.28 0.12(65) 0.22(46) 0.01(81) 8 
Africa: 
 
3.19 0.11 0.09 0.13 203 Yemen 3.19 0.02(84) 0.02(85) 0.03(75) 6 
Argentina 2.61 0.24(46) 0.14(61) 0.36(36) 32 Asia: 
 
3.41 0.31 0.33 0.29 905 
Bahamas 3.74 0.50(16) 0.34(25) 0.69(13) 8 Austria 3.68 0.41(29) 0.44(21) 0.37(33) 153 
Bolivia 3.4 0.10(67) 0.08(68) 0.12(59) 10 Belgium 3.35 0.98(2) 0.97(2) 0.99(4) 27 
Brazil 2.97 0.44(23) 0.46(19) 0.43(31) 90 Bosnia and 
 
3.88 0.31(40) 0.26(34) 0.37(34) 17 
Chile 3.62 0.50(18) 0.22(43) 0.82(9) 23 Bulgaria 3.25 0.59(12) 0.59(16) 0.58(19) 15 
Colombia 3.8 0.29(42) 0.15(59) 0.46(28) 19 Croatia 3.66 0.44(24) 0.51(18) 0.35(38) 28 
Costa Rica 3.93 0.40(32) 0.26(33) 0.56(21) 39 Estonia 2.99 0.61(10) 0.31(27) 0.95(7) 6 
Dominican 
 
3.09 0.17(59) 0.23(42) 0.10(65) 48 Finland 3.62 0.55(15) 0.20(49) 0.96(6) 10 
Ecuador 3.78 0.22(52) 0.21(48) 0.24(52) 19 Greece 2.72 0.50(19) 0.45(20) 0.55(22) 9 
El Salvador 3.58 0.24(47) 0.23(41) 0.24(51) 10 Hungary 2.78 0.42(25) 0.40(23) 0.45(29) 18 
Honduras 3.83 0.16(60) 0.14(60) 0.19(55) 15 Iceland 2.99 0.23(50) 0.43(22) 0.00(84) 5 
Jamaica 3.75 0.41(28) 0.22(44) 0.63(17) 4 Ireland 2.22 0.56(14) 0.62(13) 0.50(25) 8 
Nicaragua 3.62 0.08(70) 0.05(70) 0.11(62) 5 Italy 3.98 0.60(11) 0.92(4) 0.25(49) 481 
Panama 3.61 0.30(41) 0.21(47) 0.40(32) 38 Latvia 2.52 0.47(21) 0.30(29) 0.66(16) 18 
Peru 3.71 0.26(44) 0.24(39) 0.28(44) 15 Macedonia 3.48 0.37(36) 0.25(37) 0.52(24) 13 
Trinidad and 
 
4.03 0.41(30) 0.27(32) 0.56(20) 6 Malta 3.72 0.92(4) 0.86(7) 0.99(3) 6 
Venezuela 2.83 0.28(43) 0.15(57) 0.43(30) 26 Moldova 2.81 0.23(48) 0.12(64) 0.36(37) 10 
Americas: 
 
3.52 0.29 0.21 0.39 407 Montenegro 3.22 0.31(39) 0.30(30) 0.32(40) 7 
Afghanistan 2.46 0.01(86) 0.01(86) 0.02(79) 8 Netherlands 3.24 0.70(8) 0.73(11) 0.66(15) 24 
Armenia 3.61 0.18(57) 0.18(52) 0.18(56) 12 Norway 3.33 0.10(68) 0.18(51) 0.00(84) 12 
Azerbaijan 3.16 0.16(61) 0.15(56) 0.16(58) 19 Portugal 3.04 0.84(6) 0.91(5) 0.77(11) 16 
Bangladesh 2.59 0.47(20) 0.60(15) 0.32(41) 7 Spain 4.07 0.86(5) 0.86(6) 0.85(8) 86 
Cambodia 3.5 0.04(77) 0.04(75) 0.03(74) 10 Switzerland 4.57 0.79(7) 0.78(9) 0.79(10) 119 
Cyprus 2.81 0.38(34) 0.72(12) 0.00(84) 13 Ukraine 2.7 0.58(13) 0.23(40) 0.98(5) 14 
Georgia 2.49 0.23(49) 0.19(50) 0.28(43) 12 Yugoslavia 2.93 0.20(56) 0.33(26) 0.05(69) 28 
Hong Kong 3.92 0.42(26) 0.79(8) 0.00(84) 23 Europe: 
 
3.28 0.52 0.50 0.55 1130 
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Table 3 
Financial inclusion and bank stability: Bank level basic OLS regressions 
The dependent variable is the Z-score–defined as the sum of return-on-assets and equity ratio divided by standard 
deviation of return-on-assets of each bank over past three years – reported in columns 1-3. As robustness tests, 
we use alternative bank stability proxy i.e., the (negative of the) standard deviation of a bank’s return-on-assets – 
reported in columns 4-6. In this case, we follow Beck et al. (2013), and transform standard deviation of return-
on-assets to make it directly proportional to bank stability. All variables are averaged over 2004-12. The 
estimation is based on OLS regressions. p -values are calculated by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered for countries and are presented in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and WDI.  
  ln(Z-score) -ln(sd(ROA)) 
Variable Financial inclusion 
index 
Financial 
outreach 
dimension 
Usage 
dimension 
Financial inclusion 
index 
Financial 
outreach 
dimension 
Usage 
dimension 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Financial inclusion 0.555*** 0.507*** 0.230* 0.953*** 0.656** 0.504***  
[0.196] [0.187] [0.134] [0.246] [0.271] [0.149] 
Loan Ratio 0.584 0.512 0.55 0.413 0.272 0.392  
[0.481] [0.474] [0.497] [0.449] [0.470] [0.458] 
Bank Size 0.024 0.028 0.023 0.046* 0.052* 0.043  
[0.031] [0.030] [0.032] [0.026] [0.027] [0.027] 
Loan Loss Provision -8.852*** -8.760*** -8.955*** -8.832*** -8.751*** -9.016***  
[2.740] [2.710] [2.786] [2.702] [2.687] [2.795] 
Income Diversification -0.079 -0.094 -0.099 -0.204 -0.24 -0.227  
[0.125] [0.128] [0.133] [0.179] [0.174] [0.187] 
Management Quality 1.434** 1.449*** 1.538*** 1.550*** 1.644*** 1.693***  
[0.549] [0.541] [0.551] [0.485] [0.501] [0.493] 
Capitalisation 1.808** 1.761** 1.728** -3.428*** -3.558*** -3.524***  
[0.708] [0.687] [0.678] [0.520] [0.460] [0.470] 
Market power 0.720*** 0.655*** 0.711*** 0.497*** 0.384*** 0.508***  
[0.143] [0.140] [0.141] [0.110] [0.115] [0.110] 
GDP Growth Rate -0.248 0.801 -1.425 0.144 1.076 -1.955  
[2.839] [2.917] [2.654] [2.676] [2.962] [2.560] 
Per Capita GDP 0.016 0.02 0.054 0.021 0.053 0.074  
[0.058] [0.070] [0.059] [0.063] [0.072] [0.056] 
Constant 1.297* 1.242* 1.100* 3.810*** 3.586*** 3.547***  
[0.654] [0.711] [0.655] [0.636] [0.729] [0.613] 
Observations 2,635 2,635 2,635 2,635 2,635 2,635 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.43 0.42 0.42 
Countries 86 86 86 86 86 86 
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Table 4 
Robustness tests: Quantile regression approach 
The dependent variable is the Z-score–defined as the sum of return-on-assets and equity ratio divided by standard 
deviation of return-on-assets of each bank over past three years – reported in columns 1-9. All variables are 
averaged over 2004-12. The results are based on quantile regression approach. We use bootstrapping to obtain 
consistent standard errors, which are reported in the brackets. F-tests of the equality of slope parameters across 
various quantiles are reported at the bottom of the table. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and WDI.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9Variable
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9Financial inclusion -0.033 0.036 0.196 0.311** 0.409*** 0.620*** 0.778*** 1.103*** 1.292***
[0.230] [0.168] [0.141] [0.126] [0.130] [0.125] [0.125] [0.141] [0.228]Loan Ratio 0.605*** 0.879*** 0.713*** 0.549*** 0.525*** 0.474*** 0.344*** 0.306** 0.597***
[0.222] [0.162] [0.136] [0.121] [0.126] [0.120] [0.121] [0.136] [0.219]Bank Size 0.025 0.026* 0.033** 0.040*** 0.025** 0.027** 0.022* 0.018 -0.017
[0.022] [0.016] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.022]Loan Loss Provision -15.967*** -15.636*** -16.763*** -13.610*** -12.634*** -11.453*** -10.024*** -9.886*** -7.492***
[1.455] [1.062] [0.891] [0.797] [0.825] [0.790] [0.793] [0.890] [1.440]Income Diversification -0.034 0.035 -0.071 -0.157** -0.231*** -0.078 -0.222*** -0.203** -0.164
[0.143] [0.105] [0.088] [0.079] [0.081] [0.078] [0.078] [0.088] [0.142]Management Quality 1.807*** 1.663*** 1.473*** 1.271*** 1.360*** 1.300*** 1.335*** 1.123*** 0.471
[0.500] [0.365] [0.306] [0.274] [0.283] [0.271] [0.272] [0.306] [0.494]Capitalisation 2.187*** 2.149*** 2.414*** 2.210*** 1.826*** 1.736*** 1.560*** 1.310*** 0.578
[0.483] [0.353] [0.296] [0.265] [0.274] [0.262] [0.263] [0.296] [0.478]Market power 1.036*** 1.013*** 0.943*** 0.752*** 0.645*** 0.555*** 0.482*** 0.466*** 0.394***
[0.137] [0.100] [0.084] [0.075] [0.077] [0.074] [0.074] [0.084] [0.135]GDP Growth Rate -3.334* -3.406** -2.574** -3.101*** -2.356** -0.903 -0.498 1.018 3.497*
[2.015] [1.471] [1.234] [1.104] [1.142] [1.094] [1.098] [1.233] [1.994]Per Capita GDP 0.004 0.006 0.008 -0.019 -0.033 -0.018 -0.02 -0.037 0.036
[0.050] [0.036] [0.031] [0.027] [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] [0.031] [0.049]Constant 0.283 0.629 1.037*** 1.733*** 2.086*** 2.059*** 2.294*** 2.765*** 3.033***
[0.583] [0.426] [0.357] [0.320] [0.331] [0.317] [0.318] [0.357] [0.577]Observations 2,635 2,635 2,635 2,635 2,635 2,635 2,635 2,635 2,635Quantile F -statistics p -value0.1 vs. 0.90 28.86*** 0.0000.20 vs. 0.80 25.66*** 0.0000.30 vs. 0.70 18.33*** 0.0000.40 vs. 0.60 12.86*** 0.000Equality of slope estimates across different quantiles:Equality of slope estimates across different quantiles:
Equality of slope estimates across different quantiles:Equality of slope estimates across different quantiles:
Cross-equation hypotheses tests:
Quantile
Dependent variable: ln(Z-score)
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Table 5 
Robustness tests: Instrumental variable regressions 
The dependent variable is the Z-score–defined as the sum of return-on-assets and equity ratio divided by standard 
deviation of return-on-assets of each bank over past three years – reported in columns 1-3. As robustness tests, 
we use alternative bank stability proxy i.e., the (negative of the) standard deviation of a bank’s return-on-assets – 
reported in columns 4-6. All variables are averaged over 2004-12. The results are based on instrumental variable 
estimation. Each financial inclusion measure is treated as endogenous variable, and it is instrumented via mobile 
phone share in other countries in the same region (e.g., Asia, Africa), Borrowed from family or friends, and 
Religion. P-values are calculated by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, which are presented in brackets. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and 
WDI.  
  ln(Z-score) -ln(sd(ROA)) 
Variable Financial 
inclusion index 
Financial 
outreach 
dimension 
Usage 
dimension 
Financial 
inclusion index 
Financial 
outreach 
dimension 
Usage 
dimension 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Financial inclusion 1.780*** 1.088*** 0.03 1.894*** 1.213*** 0.743***  
[0.539] [0.303] [0.159] [0.493] [0.286] [0.145] 
Loan Ratio 0.307* 0.025 0.457*** 0.09 -0.211* 0.460***  
[0.163] [0.124] [0.132] [0.153] [0.120] [0.130] 
Bank Size 0.026** 0.041*** 0.019* 0.050*** 0.066*** 0.035***  
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] 
Loan Loss Provision -8.856*** -8.370*** -9.229*** -8.994*** -8.289*** -9.924***  
[2.321] [2.304] [2.821] [2.317] [2.294] [2.791] 
Income Diversification 0.083 -0.012 -0.106 -0.025 -0.122 -0.195**  
[0.099] [0.065] [0.081] [0.082] [0.079] [0.097] 
Management Quality 1.405*** 1.669*** 1.666*** 1.539*** 1.811*** 1.696***  
[0.350] [0.303] [0.302] [0.333] [0.292] [0.300] 
Capitalisation 2.567*** 2.260*** 1.696*** -2.818*** -3.124*** -3.407***  
[0.347] [0.302] [0.248] [0.308] [0.278] [0.250] 
Market power 1.041*** 0.817*** 0.707*** 0.729*** 0.490*** 0.581***  
[0.106] [0.079] [0.089] [0.096] [0.071] [0.079] 
GDP Growth Rate -0.505 0.601 -1.694* -0.355 1.083 -2.359**  
[1.406] [1.562] [0.975] [1.328] [1.496] [0.964] 
Per Capita GDP -0.188*** -0.120*** 0.069** -0.139** -0.072* 0.039  
[0.066] [0.044] [0.028] [0.060] [0.041] [0.028] 
Constant 2.552*** 2.077*** 1.041*** 4.832*** 4.339*** 3.769*** 
  [0.507] [0.402] [0.369] [0.469] [0.379] [0.364] 
Observations 2,439 2,439 2,564 2,439 2,439 2,564 
(Centered) R2 0.16 0.20 0.19 0.42 0.43 0.41 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 102.8 178.5 389.6 102.8 178.5 389.6 
Weak id test: KP LM statistic 65.2 129.0 318.1 65.2 129.0 318.1 
Over id test: Hansen J statistic 1.61 0.10 0.05 2.75 0.15 0.72 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.20 0.75 0.83 0.10 0.70 0.40 
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Table 6 
Robustness tests: Alternative measure of financial inclusion 
In this table, we use financial inclusion indicators of Global Findex database based on World Bank for the year 
2011. All other variables are averaged over 2004-12.  The results are based on instrumental variable estimation. 
Each Global Findex indicator is treated as endogenous variable, and it is instrumented via Ethnic fractionalization 
that is collected from Easterly and Levine (1997) and Religion. P-values are calculated by the heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors, which are presented in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and WDI.  
  ln(Z-score) 
Variable Adults with an account at a formal financial institution 
to total adults 
Adults saving at a 
financial institution in the 
past year to total adults 
  1 2 
Global financial inclusion index 0.996*** 0.734**  
[0.352] [0.321] 
Loan Ratio 0.192 0.215  
[0.135] [0.138] 
Bank Size 0.028** 0.042***  
[0.012] [0.012] 
Loan Loss Provision -7.565*** -8.223***  
[2.746] [2.452] 
Income Diversification -0.101 -0.032  
[0.075] [0.063] 
Management Quality 1.981*** 1.987***  
[0.351] [0.334] 
Capitalisation 2.113*** 2.144***  
[0.352] [0.347] 
Market power 0.858*** 0.796***  
[0.093] [0.088] 
GDP Growth Rate -0.731 -3.587***  
[1.233] [1.211] 
Per Capita GDP -0.105* -0.042  
[0.057] [0.035] 
Constant 1.724*** 1.528***  
[0.484] [0.419] 
Observations 2,051 2,223 
(Centered) R2 0.17 0.17 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 373.2 483.7 
Weak id test: KP LM statistic 343.1 464.8 
Over id test: Hansen J statistic 0.84 0.08 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.36 0.78 
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Table 7 
Robustness tests: Alternative sample 
This table reports robustness tests of financial inclusion and banking stability. The results are based on 
instrumental variable estimation. In columns 1-3, we split the sample into three terciles based on financial 
inclusion index and re-run IV regressions while using Z-score as the dependent variable. All variables are averaged 
over 2004-12. Each variable of interest is treated as endogenous variable, and it is instrumented via mobile phone 
share in other countries in the same region (e.g., Asia, Africa), Religion, and Borrowed from family or friends. In 
column 4 (5), we dropped observations of developed (developing) countries, and re-run regressions as usual. P-
values are calculated by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, which are presented in brackets. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and WDI.  
  ln(Z-score) 
Variables Tercile 1: the 
lowest financial 
inclusion 
Tercile 2: 
medium 
financial 
inclusion 
Tercile 3: the 
highest financial 
inclusion 
Only Developing 
Countries: 
Developed 
Countries 
excludedǂ 
Only 
Developed 
countries: 
Developing 
countries 
excluded 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Financial inclusion 2.179*** 4.186*** 5.025*** 2.734*** 0.535**  
[0.746] [1.498] [1.265] [0.866] [0.253] 
Loan Ratio 0.553** 0.401** -0.297 0.360* -0.099  
[0.238] [0.184] [0.310] [0.199] [0.185] 
Bank Size 0.085*** -0.018 0.098*** 0.044** 0.038**  
[0.018] [0.015] [0.029] [0.020] [0.016] 
Loan Loss Provision -9.444*** -10.110*** -7.496** -10.751*** -6.566**  
[1.026] [2.133] [2.919] [1.027] [3.027] 
Income Diversification -0.606** -0.284 0.051 -0.216 0.015  
[0.239] [0.324] [0.103] [0.278] [0.067] 
Management Quality 0.828** -0.098 3.101*** 0.589* 2.138***  
[0.334] [0.457] [1.121] [0.320] [0.653] 
Capitalisation 2.051*** 1.303*** 10.035*** 1.820*** 2.720***  
[0.324] [0.493] [2.417] [0.298] [0.674] 
Market power 0.667*** 0.763*** 1.051*** 0.714*** 1.114***  
[0.110] [0.151] [0.181] [0.129] [0.152] 
GDP Growth Rate -3.810*** 14.919*** -4.221 0.532 -3.445*  
[1.215] [5.670] [7.551] [1.476] [1.964] 
Per Capita GDP -0.243*** 0.292*** -0.359 -0.235** 0.216***  
[0.049] [0.072] [0.222] [0.095] [0.083] 
Constant 3.411*** -1.607 -1.212 3.451*** -1.316  
[0.456] [1.483] [1.943] [0.695] [0.873] 
Observations 831 937 686 934 1,526 
(Centered) R2 0.27 0.22 0.15 0.14 0.18 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 203.7 94.28 59.78 78.35 246.1 
Weak id test: KP LM statistic 111.3 26.47 46.24 43.73 342.8 
Over id test: Hansen J statistic 2.63 1.92 0.18 0.49 0.03 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.11 0.17 0.67 0.49 0.86 
ǂ The countries we dropped are: Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates. 
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Table 8 
Robustness tests: the dynamic panel system GMM estimation results 
The dependent and independent variables are analogous. We employ two-step system GMM panel model. All 
regressions include year fixed effects. Lagged values of all regressors are used in the estimation. We have treated 
lagged dependent variable as the endogenous variable in the GMM-style instruments, where for the case of the 
transformed equation, lags of two and higher; and for the case of levels equation, lags of one are used. AR(2) is 
the p-value of the test for second-order autocorrelation. Hansen is the p-value of Hansen (1982) test of over-
identifying restrictions. t-statistics of system GMM model are reported in brackets, which are based on 
Windmeijer (2005)-corrected standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and WDI. Coverage: 2004-12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable
Financial 
inclusion 
index
Financial 
outreach 
dimension
Usage 
dimension
Financial 
inclusion 
index
Financial 
outreach 
dimension
Usage 
dimension
1 2 3 4 5 6
Lagged dependent 0.619*** 0.619*** 0.620*** 0.561*** 0.562*** 0.561***
[0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030]
Financial inclusion 0.212*** 0.228*** 0.072* 0.433*** 0.347*** 0.220***
[0.064] [0.055] [0.044] [0.072] [0.061] [0.047]
Loan Ratio 0.202*** 0.182*** 0.188*** 0.199*** 0.146** 0.190***
[0.068] [0.067] [0.069] [0.072] [0.070] [0.073]
Bank Size 0.014** 0.016** 0.014** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.022***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007]
Loan Loss Provision -1.185*** -1.174*** -1.205*** -1.344*** -1.333*** -1.383***
[0.396] [0.391] [0.409] [0.464] [0.463] [0.489]
Income Diversification -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Management Quality 0.604*** 0.595*** 0.647*** 0.666*** 0.684*** 0.736***
[0.138] [0.137] [0.138] [0.144] [0.142] [0.145]
Capitalisation 0.790*** 0.796*** 0.758*** -1.329*** -1.342*** -1.376***
[0.146] [0.146] [0.144] [0.172] [0.173] [0.171]
Market power 0.126** 0.102** 0.108** 0.011 -0.046 0
[0.051] [0.049] [0.052] [0.048] [0.046] [0.050]
GDP Growth Rate 2.484*** 2.577*** 2.362*** 2.454*** 2.523*** 2.223***
[0.386] [0.392] [0.381] [0.375] [0.380] [0.371]
Per Capita GDP 0.040*** 0.033** 0.063*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.086***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.012] [0.015] [0.016] [0.013]
Constant 0.158 0.22 -0.0002 1.323*** 1.305*** 1.056***
[0.148] [0.149] [0.138] [0.170] [0.170] [0.156]
Observations 11,339 11,339 11,339 11,339 11,339 11,339
F-statistics 118.1 121.6 115.9 269.3 267 259.1
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(2) 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.39 0.35 0.40
Hansen (p -value) 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.81 0.79 0.78
ln(Z-score) -ln(sd(ROA))
49 
 
Table 9 
The effects of financial inclusion after the global financial crisis 
The dependent variable is the Z-score–defined as the sum of return-on-assets and equity ratio divided by standard 
deviation of return-on-assets of each bank over past three years – reported in columns 1-2. As robustness tests, 
we use alternative bank stability proxy i.e., the (negative of the) standard deviation of a bank’s return-on-assets – 
reported in columns 3-4. In this case, we follow Beck et al. (2013), and transform standard deviation of return-
on-assets to make it directly proportional to bank stability. While for the case of pre-crisis period, all variables are 
averaged over 2004-07, for the post-crisis period, all variables are averaged over 2008-12. The estimation is based 
on OLS regressions. p -values are calculated by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for 
countries and are presented in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. Source: BankScope and WDI.  
  ln(Z-score) -ln(sd(ROA)) 
Variable Pre-crisis  
(2004-07) 
Post-crisis  
(2008-12) 
Pre-crisis  
(2004-07) 
Post-crisis  
(2008-12) 
  1 2 3 4 
Financial inclusion 0.346 0.587*** 0.714* 0.999***  
[0.311] [0.208] [0.377] [0.291] 
Loan Ratio 0.857 0.658 0.861 0.505  
[0.869] [0.522] [0.719] [0.525] 
Bank Size 0.034 0.021 0.062 0.047*  
[0.045] [0.030] [0.039] [0.026] 
Loan Loss Provision -8.666*** -6.625* -7.825*** -6.696*  
[2.444] [3.725] [1.976] [3.625] 
Income Diversification -0.016 -0.054** -0.22 -0.077*  
[0.371] [0.026] [0.514] [0.039] 
Management Quality 1.568 1.667*** 1.391 1.941***  
[1.197] [0.586] [0.956] [0.494] 
Capitalisation 1.89 2.023** -3.252*** -3.325***  
[1.140] [0.833] [0.948] [0.609] 
Market power 0.501*** 0.863*** 0.355** 0.584***  
[0.176] [0.199] [0.155] [0.153] 
GDP Growth Rate -2.597 3.975 -5.274** 5.235**  
[2.364] [2.834] [2.528] [2.489] 
Per Capita GDP 0.079 0.067 0.073 0.078  
[0.071] [0.063] [0.085] [0.057] 
Constant 0.654 0.425 3.569*** 2.660***  
[1.230] [0.698] [1.094] [0.622] 
Observations 1,320 2,498 1,320 2,498 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.18 0.39 0.37 
Countries 67 83 67 83 
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Table 10 
The effect of retail deposit funding, market power, and institutional quality on bank 
stability 
The regression model is:  
,
,
 (    ,    ,  ,  
                                    ,   )
i j j j
i j j
Bank stability f Financial inclusion x HIGH Financial inclusion x LOW HIGH
Bank characteristics Country characteristics
=
  
The dependent variable is the Z-score–defined as the sum of return-on-assets and equity ratio divided by standard 
deviation of return-on-assets of each bank over past three years. All variables are averaged over 2004-12. In Panel 
A, HIGH equals one if the bank’s retail deposit funding share exceeds the sample average and zero otherwise. In 
Panel B, HIGH equals one if the bank’s marginal cost exceeds sample average and zero otherwise. In Panel C, 
HIGH equals one if the bank’s market power exceeds sample average and zero otherwise. In Panel D, HIGH 
equals one if the country’s institutional quality exceeds the sample average and zero otherwise. In all panels, LOW 
is measured as one minus HIGH. The estimation is based on OLS regressions. P-values are calculated by the 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for countries and are presented in brackets. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and WDI. 
  Financial inclusion index and its dimensions 
Variable Financial inclusion index Financial outreach dimension Usage dimension 
Panel A: HIGH indicates banks with HIGH deposit funding share above sample average 
Financial inclusion x HIGH deposit funding share (β1) 0.391** 0.519** 0.123  
[0.162] [0.206] [0.081] 
Financial inclusion x LOW deposit funding share (β2) 0.129 0.316 -0.138  
[0.292] [0.262] [0.202] 
All control variables  Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics for test: β1 = β2  3.05 3.57 2.73 
p-value for test 0.05 0.03 0.07 
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.21 0.20 
Number of observations 2,295 2,295 2,295 
Panel B: HIGH indicates banks with HIGH marginal costs above sample average 
Financial inclusion x HIGH marginal costs (β1) 0.041 0.013 -0.077  
[0.353] [0.365] [0.257] 
Financial inclusion x LOW marginal costs (β2) 0.600*** 0.525*** 0.281*  
[0.216] [0.179] [0.161] 
All control variables  Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics for test: β1 = β2  0.02 0.06 1.28 
p-value for test 0.98 0.94 0.28 
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Number of observations 2,635 2,635 2,635 
Panel C: HIGH indicates banks with HIGH market power above sample average 
Financial inclusion x HIGH market power (β1) 0.546** 0.570** 0.102  
[0.242] [0.235] [0.158] 
Financial inclusion x LOW market power (β2) 0.315 0.405* 0.081  
[0.241] [0.217] [0.187] 
All control variables  Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics for test: β1 = β2  3.31 3.35 1.21 
p-value for test 0.04 0.04 0.30 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.16 0.15 
Number of observations 2,635 2,635 2,635 
Panel D: HIGH indicates country with HIGH institutional quality above sample average 
Financial inclusion x HIGH institutional quality (β1) 0.636*** 0.594*** 0.469***  
[0.207] [0.204] [0.157] 
Financial inclusion x LOW institutional quality (β2) 0.315 0.429 -0.29  
[0.537] [0.316] [0.285] 
All control variables  Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics for test: β1 = β2  4.92 4.75 4.67 
p-value for test 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Number of observations 2,635 2,635 2,635 
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            Figure 1. Financial inclusion index 
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